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ABSTRACT: The post-Kantians were inspired by Kant’s Critique of Judgment to forge a new 
synthesis of natural philosophy, art and history that would overcome the dualisms and gulfs 
within Kant’s philosophy. Focusing on biology and showing how Schelling reworked and 
transformed Kant’s insights, it is argued that Schelling was largely successful in laying the 
foundations for this synthesis, although he was not always consistent in building on these 
foundations. To appreciate this achievement, it is argued that Schelling should not be 
interpreted as an idealist but as a process metaphysician; as he claimed, overcoming the 
oppositions between idealism and realism, spiritualism and materialism. It is also argued that 
as a process metaphysician, Schelling not merely defended an organic view of nature but 
developed a theory of emergence and a new conception of life relevant to current theoretical 
and philosophical biology. This interpretation provides a defense of process metaphysics as the 
logical successor to Kant’s critical philosophy and thereby as the most defensible tradition of 
philosophy up to the present. It provides the foundations for post-reductionist science, 
reconciling the sciences, the arts and the humanities, and provides the basis for a more 
satisfactory ethics and political philosophy. Most importantly, it overcomes the nihilism of 
European civilization, providing the foundations for a global ecological civilization.  
KEYWORDS: Kant, Schelling, Process Metaphysics, Naturphilosophie, Philosophical Biology, 
Theoretical Biology, Ecological Civilization 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Despite his enormous influence, for most of the Twentieth Century F.W.J. von 
Schelling was dismissed by most philosophers as someone who began a tradition of 
pseudoscience, someone who had been superseded by Hegel, and as someone who, 
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attacking Hegelianism after Hegel’s death, had inspired a tradition of irrationalism 
that, as György Lukács argued, helped pave the way for Naziism.1 There were a 
handful of philosophers who took Schelling seriously, notably Martin Heidegger, Karl 
Jaspers and Maurice Merleau-Ponty; however, this side of their work was largely 
ignored. All this changed towards the end of the Twentieth Century. The revival of 
interest in Schelling’s philosophy has engendered a new appreciation of his originality, 
but also a diversity of interpretations and evaluations of his work. He has been 
interpreted as one of the philosophers who failed to understand Kant, as an Objective 
Idealist whose significance matched that of Hegel, as a materialist who extricated 
himself from the pernicious influence of Kant, and as someone who overcame 
Idealism. Some of the most important debates have been associated with the 
reexamination of Schelling’s contribution to natural philosophy and science. 
Historians of science identified Schelling as the source of ideas central to the advance 
beyond Galilean and Newtonian science. This argument produced a reaction and a 
revival of the claim that Schelling made no contribution to science and misled 
scientists away from the fruitful ideas developed by Kant. These debates have broader 
ramifications, for if Schelling’s work in natural philosophy and science can be 
successfully defended, this also justifies other aspects of his philosophy, including his 
reconception of both philosophy and science, his defense of art and history, his notion 
of dialectical rationality, his ideas on education, and most importantly, his quest for a 
philosophy that would overcome the nihilism that Friedrich Jacobi claimed was the 
inevitable outcome of rational thought.2
Focusing on the crucial question of teleology and the nature of life, in this paper I 
will argue that in his early career, under the tutelage of Goethe, Schelling not only 
advanced Kant’s insights but successfully used these advances to overcome the 
 Proposing a fusion of Western and Eastern 
forms of consciousness, Schelling laid the philosophical foundations for a global 
civilization. If Schelling can be defended, it will have to be concluded that the 
marginalization of Schelling’s philosophy has adversely affected the subsequent 
development of philosophy, science and civilization, and that it will be necessary to 
recover the path he chartered for the future. 
                                                     
1 György Lukács, Die Zerstörung der Vernunft: Der Weg des Irrationalismus von Schelling zu Hitler, (Berlin (East): 
Aufbau-Verlag, 1957), 8 and passim. Translated as The Destruction of Reason by Peter Palmer, (London: 
Merlin Press, 1980). On this work, see Max Rieser, “Lukacs’ Critique of German Philosophy”, The 
Journal of Philosophy, 55(5) (Feb.27, 1958): 177-196.  
2 Schelling had a major influence on the Humboldtian model of the university and the Humboldtian 
philosophy of education. See Frederick Gregory, “Kant, Schelling, and the Administration of Science in 
the Romantic Era”, Osiris, 2nd Series, 5 (1989): 16-35. Jacobi had already identified the nihilism that 
Friedrich Nietzsche later recognized as the greatest problem of modernity. 
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incoherencies in Kant’s whole system of philosophy while preserving Kant’s most 
important insights. In doing so, he created a more coherent system of philosophy than 
Kant (or Hegel) which was neither idealist nor materialist, but as he himself claimed, 
a system that overcame the oppositions between idealism and realism, spiritualism 
and materialism.3
To understand Schelling’s achievement it is necessary to understand his 
philosophy as a solution to the problems raised by Kant’s philosophy. Kant’s 
philosophy evolved through a constant struggle to meet the criticisms of his 
contemporaries, and to the end of his life Kant was struggling to overcome 
deficiencies in his earlier work. Many of the criticisms were directed at what were seen 
to be the unbridgeable dualisms in his philosophy. The Critique of Judgment was written 
in part as a response to such criticisms. Accepting subjective and objective 
purposiveness justified ascribing purposiveness to some supersensible basis of 
experience, thereby explaining how the manifold of empirical laws could form a unity 
 It was, I will argue, the first coherent system of process metaphysics, 
and should be seen as the origin of the tradition of process philosophy. Ultimately, I 
will suggest, by showing that process metaphysics is required to solve the most 
fundamental problems faced by modern philosophy and science, he demonstrated the 
superiority of process metaphysics to scientific materialism, Kant and Neo-
Kantianism and Hegelian Absolute Idealism. Embracing, revising and extending 
Kant’s notion of construction, Schelling developed a form of dialectical rationality 
that avoided both Hegelian hyperrationalism which had reduced nature to an “other” 
posited by Spirit and dissolved the individual into a cipher of Reason, and the 
Nietzschean irrationalism that, Lukács complained, had paved the way for Naziism.  
                                                     
3 F.W.J. von Schelling, On the History of Modern Philosophy, trans. Andrew Bowie, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994), 120; (SW I/10: 105) I have referred to English translations of the works examined 
with references to the German collected editions. I will use a number of abbreviations for collected works 
of Kant, Fichte and Schelling. 
 Ak Kants gesammelte Schriften (Berlin: Königlich Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaten, 
1902- ). 
FW Fichte’s Werke, ed. I.A. Fichte (Berlin: Walter D. Gruyter & Co., 1971), reprint of 
Johann Gottlieb Fichtes sämmtliche Werke, ed. I.A. Fichte (Berlin: Veit & Comp., 
1845/46). 
Ge Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Gesamtaugsgabe, ed. Reinhard Lauth and Hans Jacob 
(Stuttgart: Friedrich Fromann, 1965- ). 
PN F.W.J. Schelling, Ideen zu einer Philosophie Der Natur (Landschut: Philipp Krüll, 1803). 
SW F.W.J. Schelling, Sämmtliche Werke, ed. K.F.A. Schelling I Abtheilung vols 1-10, II 
Abtheilung vols 1-4, (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1856-61). 
We Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, Werke: Historisch-kritische Ausgabe, ed. Hans 
Michael Baumgartner, Wilhelm G. Jacobs, and Hermann Krings (Stuttgart: 
Fromann-Holzboorg, 1976- ). 
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through intelligent design and at the same time how moral action is possible. To this 
end, it was incumbent on Kant to justify and provide the foundations for biology as a 
distinct science, the execution of which was a major contribution to the development 
of biology. However, despite his quest, Kant left teleology as a regulative principle of 
reflective judgment (although at the end of the Critique of Judgment he expressed 
dissatisfaction with this), and left a gulf between organic nature and inorganic nature. 
This failed to satisfy his critics, or himself. In particular, critics questioned Kant’s 
cognitive dualism, arguing that he had not demonstrated the applicability of a priori 
concepts to independently received sensations and so could not demonstrate that 
there could be objective knowledge of empirical reality. They also pointed to the 
inconsistency between the limits to knowledge claimed by Kant and his postulation of 
a noumenal realm of things-in-themselves behind appearances. While a number of 
Kant’s disciples grappled with the problem of reconciling freedom and necessity, 
physics and biology and relating concepts to the sensory manifold, the most radical 
solution to the problems of critical philosophy was offered by Schelling. Accepting 
Fichte’s argument that practical reason precedes theoretical reason and that the self-
conscious “I” could not be assumed but had to be explained as emerging through 
mutual recognition, Schelling argued that it is also necessary to appreciate that we are 
part of nature, and that it is necessary to explain how ideation can have emerged 
within nature. For Schelling, knowledge is not transcendental insofar as it determines 
nature for consciousness. Nature is transcendental as the producer of intelligence able 
to cognize nature. Nature must be seen as capable of organizing itself, generating life 
and the human consciousness capable of knowing nature. From this perspective, the 
organic is not divided from the rest of nature but is seen as a particular kind of self-
organization, which is the condition for the emergence of consciousness. Biology 
comes to take an even more central place in Schelling’s philosophy than in Kant’s.  
I will examine and evaluate this proposal for what amounts to a “naturalization of 
the transcendental”, as Iain Hamilton Grant put it, and a “hermeneutics of nature”, 
as Andrew Bowie characterized Schelling’s philosophy of nature.4
                                                     
4 Iain Hamilton Grant, Philosophies of Nature After Schelling, (London: Continuum, 2008), 119 and Andrew 
Bowie, “The Hermeneutics of Nature”, Schelling and Modern European Philosophy, (London: Routledge, 
1993), ch.2.  
 This will be seen to 
involve not only a further development of Kant’s conception of life, but a new view of 
the relationship between physics, biology and history, and between philosophy, 
science and the humanities. As John Zammito put it, Schelling’s philosophy realized 
“the metaphysical potential [the Critique of Judgment] seemed to suggest” in which 
“[n]ature, art, and history … [could] be welded into a grander synthesis than Kant 
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himself had dared.”5
THE INCOMPLETENESS OF KANT’S PHILOSOPHY 
 It demonstrated, I will argue, that process metaphysics is the 
logical solution to the problems raised by Kant’s philosophy. In providing this 
solution Schelling’s work demonstrated that process metaphysics is not only the most 
promising path for the development of critical philosophy; it is the most promising 
path for philosophy as such, and the most promising foundation for the sciences and 
the humanities. The present work should be read as an effort to demonstrate the 
logical coherence of Schelling’s insights and their potential, insights that are at the 
core of the tradition of process metaphysics and which will take generations to fully 
clarify and elaborate. It will be suggested that philosophers did take the wrong path 
into the future, and that they need to retrace this path and embrace the tradition of 
process metaphysics as the basis for overcoming the problems that civilization is now 
facing, most importantly, the global ecological crisis, and thereby, to lay the 
foundations for an “ecological civilization”. 
It is widely believed that Schelling’s philosophy of nature was an obstacle to the 
advance of science while Kant’s philosophy was a major contribution to it.6
                                                     
5 John H. Zammito , The Genesis of Kant’s Critique of Judgment, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 
14. 
 Kant is 
6 This is the view widely held in the past. Schelling’s contribution to science was strongly argued by 
Joseph L. Esposito, Schelling’s Idealism and Philosophy of Nature, (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1977). 
Timothy Lenoir defended the orthodox view in “The Göttingen School and the Development of 
Transcendental Naturphilosophie in the Romantic Era”, Studies in History of Biology, 5 (1981): 111-205 and in 
The Strategy of Life: Teleology and Mechanics in Nineteenth Century German Biology, (Chicago and London: 
University of Chicago Press, 1982), esp. 5. Lenoir argues that it was Kant who put nineteenth century 
biology on a solid foundation. For a critique of Lenoir, see Robert J. Richards, The Romantic Conception of 
Life: Science and Philosophy in the Age of Goethe, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), esp. ch.5 & 6, 
Frederick C. Beiser, German Idealism: The Struggle Against Subjectivism, 1781-1801, (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 2002), ch.4 &5, especially the footnotes to these pages on 684-5 and Iain 
Hamilton Grant, Philosophies of Nature After Schelling (London: Continuum, 2008), 120-38. For a highly 
critical review of Lenoir’s book see K.L. Caneva, “Teleology with Regrets”, Annals of Science, 47(3) (1990): 
291-300. For a recent study of this debate, see John H. Zammito, “The Lenoir thesis revisted: 
Blumenbach and Kant”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 42(x) (2011) 
forthcoming. Further support for those defending the importance of Schelling has come from Marie-
Luise Heuser-Kessler, in particular from her, Die Produktivität der Natur: Schellings Naturphilosophie und das neue 
Paradigma der Selbsorganization in den Naturwissenschaften, (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1986) where she 
argues that it was Schelling who originated the view of nature as self-organizing that is now being 
developed in complexity theory. She has also shown the influence of Schelling on mathematics and post-
Newtonian physics (see also her “Geometrical Product – Exponentiation – Evolution. Justus Günter 
Grassmann and Dynamist Naturphilosophie” in G. Schubring (ed.) Hermann Günter Grassmann (1809-1877): 
Visionary Mathematician, Scientist and Neohumanist Scholar, (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1996), 47-58). Her argument 
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seen to have bequeathed a complete system of philosophy that gave a place to physics, 
ethics and political philosophy, art and the study of life. In the concluding paragraph 
to “Preface” to the Critique of Judgment, Kant proclaimed: “With this, then, I conclude 
my entire critical enterprise.”7 Kant had examined the nature of judgment of taste in 
art and of final causes in things, providing a place for purpose in art, in organisms, 
and in nature as a whole. A place was given to aesthetic experience and to life, and 
nature’s subjective and objective purposiveness was equated with a supersensible basis 
for that purposiveness. This provided a principle that makes possible our 
comprehension of order in natural diversity,8
This did not complete the development of Kant’s philosophy, however. Kant 
continued to grapple with the problems raised by his critics and by contemporary 
advances in the sciences. Even Kant’s supporters were dissatisfied with his rejection in 
the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason of the possibility of deriving the 
categories from some principle,
 bridging the gulf between nature as 
understood through science as defended through Kant’s theoretical philosophy, and 
as required by moral law as characterized in Kant’s practical philosophy. The 
concept of organism thereby mediated between the phenomenal and the noumenal. 
The system appeared to be complete, with only some loose arguments requiring 
refinement.  
9
                                                                                                                                           
has been criticized by Bernd-Olaf Küppers in Natur als Organismus: Schellings frühe Naturphilosophie und ihre 
Bedeutung für die modern Biologie (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1992). For an overview of Romantic science and 
its influence, see Romanticism and the Sciences, ed. Andrew Cunningham & Nicholas Jardine (Cambridge: 
C.U.P., 1990). See also Romanticism in Science: Science in Europe, 1790-1840, ed. Stafano Poggi and Maurizio 
Rossi (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994). 
 while his critics focused upon the problematic 
7 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. Werner S. Pluhar, (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987), 7; (Ak 5:170). 
8 Rachel Zuckert argues that providing this is the central concern of this Critique. See Kant on Beauty and 
Biology: An Interpretation of the Critique of Judgment, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 5. 
9 See Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1996), §21 
“Comment” 186-7; (B144-46). This was seen as a major weakness in Kant’s system by his followers, and a 
point of departure for the development of their own philosophical systems. See Between Kant and Hegel: 
Texts in the Development of Post-Kantian Idealism, trans. and intros by George Di Giovanni and H.S. Harris, 
rev. ed. (Indianaoplis: Hackett, 2000). See also Frederick C. Beiser, The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy 
from Kant to Fichte (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 240-4, Beiser, German Idealism, ch.9 and 
Daniel Breazeale, “Fichte and Schelling: The Jena Period”, The Age of German Idealism, ed. Robert C. 
Solomon and Kathleen M. Higgins (London: Routledge, 1993), ch.5. A. Zvie Bar-On has argued that 
Kant could not have derived his categories through his transcendental logic. See his The Categories and the 
Principle of Coherence: Whitehead’s Theory of Categories in Historical Perspective (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1987), 74-77. 
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dualism in his philosophy between the categories and sensible experience.10 F.H. 
Jacobi argued that the appeal to the “thing-in-itself” is incompatible with Kant’s 
critical principles.11 Gottlob Schulze argued that Kant and the Kantians were caught 
in a circle, claiming to demonstrate the validity of the categories by referring them to 
experience, and then demonstrate the possibility of experience, as defined by the 
categories, by referring back to the categories.12 The most telling criticisms, as far as 
Kant was concerned, came from Solomon Maimon who argued that it is impossible 
to apply synthetic a priori principles to experience. There is no way to distinguish cases 
where they do apply from those where they do not since neither experience nor 
understanding provides a criterion for this.13
In his last years Kant was working towards a new architectonic for his 
philosophical system to meet these criticisms and to take into account recent advances 
in the sciences.
 These criticisms revealed the possibility 
that the order of sense events is not among these events but is merely superimposed 
on them by the subject.  
14 Centrally, Kant was struggling with the relationship between a priori 
knowledge of objects in general and objects of the external senses.15 In the first 
introduction to the Critique of Judgment Kant conceded that while the Critique of Pure 
Reason showed that nature constitutes a system in terms of transcendental laws, it does 
not follow that nature is, in terms of its empirical laws, a system that human cognitive 
power can grasp.16 This unity is a principle of reflective judgment whereby the 
particular is subsumed under the universal and the universal found in the particular.17
                                                     
10 These criticisms are echoed in S. Körner, “The Impossibility of Transcendental Deductions”, Monist, 
51 (1967): 317-331 and more recent works taking up Körner’s argument. See also Thomas M. Seebohm, 
“Fichte's and Husserl's critique of Kant's transcendental deduction”, Husserl Studies 2(1) (1985): 53-74. 
 
11 On this, Beiser, The Fate of Reason, 124. 
12 See G.E. Schulz, “Aenesidemus”, in Between Kant and Hegel, ed. and trans. Di Giovanni and Harris, 
p105-135. See also George Di Giovanni, “Kant’s Metaphysics of Nature and Schelling’s Ideas for a 
Philosophy of Nature”, Journal of the History of Philosophy 17(2) (April 1979): 201.  
13 This argument is summed up in Solomon Maimon, “Letters to Philaletes”, Between Kant and Hegel, trans. 
and ed. Di Giovanni and Harris, 159-203. For an analysis of this argument, see Beiser, “Solomon’s 
Critical Philosophy”, The Fate of Reason, ch. 10, esp. 289.  
14 On this, see Di Giovanni, “Kant’s Metaphysics of Nature and Schelling’s Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature”: 
197-215. Kant’s efforts to adjust his philosophy to accord with contemporary advances in science are 
detailed in Michael Friedman, Kant and the Exact Sciences (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 
esp. Part II.  
15 Immanuel Kant, “Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science”, [1786], in Philosophy of Material Nature, 
trans. James W. Ellington, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1985), 13; (Ak 4:476). 
16 Immanuel Kant, “Introduction (first unpublished introduction)”, in Critique of Judgment, 397; (Ak 20: 
209). 
17 Immanuel Kant, “Introduction (first unpublished introduction)”  in Critique of Judgment, 398; (Ak 20: 210) 
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But reflective judgment cannot classify all the empirical variety of nature unless it 
presupposes that nature itself makes its transcendental laws specific in terms of some 
principle,18 a principle which can only be that of nature’s appropriateness for the 
power of judgment.19 This suggests purpose in nature, but Kant had argued in the 
Critique of Judgment that this can only be presupposed as a regulative principle of 
reflective judgment; it cannot be proved. Given Kant’s quest for apodictic knowledge, 
this was a major weakness in Kant’s philosophy. And even accepting purpose does not 
show us how to apply these ideas to the study of nature. It is still necessary, Kant 
concluded, to consider what he called in his incomplete work of his final years, 
published posthumously as the Opus postumum, “The Transition from the Metaphysical 
Foundations of Natural Science to Physics.”20
Although it is possible to find throughout Kant’s work some ambivalence about 
the doctrines he was defending, in his critical attitude to his earlier work, the Opus 
postumum was a radical departure. Kant abandoned the identification of nature as the 
sum total of “things,”
  
21 as assumed in Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. Matter 
itself had to be explained rather than presupposed as in the Metaphysical Foundations 
where Kant explained matter’s occupancy of space through force,22 but treated force 
as a property of matter.23 The Opus postumum also offered an outline of a system of all 
objects of the outer senses based on the notion self-limitation. As he put it: “In this 
transition from the metaphysical foundations of natural science to physics there is 
[also] that from matter to the formation of bodies. A body is a self-limiting whole, by 
the united attraction of the parts of a quantity of matter.”24
                                                     
18 As Kant had argued in the Critique of Pure Reason, “we must throughout presuppose the systematic unity 
of nature as objectively valid and necessary.” 624 (A651/B679). 
 Physical bodies were 
divided into the inorganic and the organic, in which the “physically organic body” 
was defined in contrast to a mechanically organic body as “one, each of whose parts is 
by nature there in it for the sake of the other; in which, conversely, the concept of the 
whole also determines the form of the parts – externally as well as internally (in figure 
19 Immanuel Kant, “Introduction (first unpublished introduction)” in Critique of Judgment, 403; (Ak 20: 215). 
20 Eckart Förster, “Introduction” to Immanuel Kant, Opus Posthumum, ed. Eckart Förster, trans. Eckart 
Förster and Michael Rosen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), xvi. 
21 See “Preface” to “Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science” [1786] in Kant, Philosophy of Material 
Nature, 3-4; (Ak 4:467). 
22 Kant, “Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science”, Philosophy of Material Nature, 44 (Ak 4:499). 
23 As Schelling noted. See Joan Steigerwald, “The dynamics of reason and its elusive object in Kant, 
Fichte and Schelling”, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, 34 (2003): 127. 
24 Kant, Opus postumum, 100; (Ak 22: 282). 
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and texture).”25 The problem he now posed was how such self-organization is possible 
rather than merely postulating this as a regulative principle. Early in the work he had 
argued that the “totality of matter” is “a universally distributed world-material, is 
internally active and unceasing, and keeps all matter in continual – not progressive – 
agitation, by attraction and repulsion.”26 In later drafts, after having denied that 
matter could organize itself and having argued that “only an immaterial substance 
can contain the ground of possibility of organic bodies”,27 Kant postulated “an 
immaterial substance” able to organize matter as “the ground of the possibility of 
organic bodies.”28 This immaterial substance and associated forces broke with the 
categories Kant had previously defended,29 and led him to claim that we must 
presuppose a priori forces and their unity as an individual object, the condition of there 
being experience.30
… physics is constituted, not out of and from experience, but, [by means of] the 
concept of the unity of moving forces, for the possibility of experience (by means 
of observation and experiment) according to the principles of investigation of 
nature. … The appearance of appearances (that is, how the subject is mediately 
affected) is metaphysically [the same] as how the subject makes itself into an 
object (is conscious of itself as determinable in intuition). It contains the principle 
of the combination of the moving forces in space, in order to realize space 
through empirical representation, according to its form – not through 
experience, but for the sake of the possibility of experience as a system of the 
subject’s empirical representations.
 The transition to physics requires that the subject recognize itself 
as a force acting on the forces of nature, constituting itself as an empirical object for 
itself, thereby making space and time sensible. As Kant put it:  
31
On the basis of these reflections Kant redefined transcendental philosophy as “the act 
of consciousness whereby the subject becomes the originator of itself and, thereby, 
also of the whole object of technical-practical and moral-practical reason in one 
system.”
  
32
                                                     
25 Kant, Opus postumum, 100; (Ak 22: 283).  This reaffirmed and amplified a view of organisms put forward 
in §65 of the Critique of Judgment, but from which Kant then retreated. On this, see Richards in The 
Romantic Conception of Life, 229-37. 
 
26 Kant, Opus postumum, 64; (Ak 21: 210). 
27 Kant, Opus postumum, 149; (Ak 22: 507). 
28 Kant, Opus postumum, 149; (Ak 22: 507). 
29 As Eckart Förster noted in his introduction to the translation of Opus postumum, xxxvii. 
30 Kant, Opus postumum, 100; (Ak 22: 283). 
31 Kant, Opus postumum, 109-110; (Ak 22: 325f). 
32 Kant, Opus postumum, 245; (Ak 21: 78). 
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Seen in the light of these ideas, Schelling, even though he had no access to these 
ruminations (which might have been influenced by Schelling’s work), can easily be 
seen to have been carrying through Kant’s project.33 His solution to the question 
“How do we know that our concepts conform to objects?” was to develop a 
metaphysics in which, by reconceiving being as productive activity, he was able to 
make the interaction between the mental and the physical, the subjective and the 
objective and the ideal and the real, intelligible in accordance with Kant’s view that 
we only know what we construct.  It should, then, be a simple matter to work out the 
coherence of Schelling’s philosophy and then evaluate his proposed solution to 
overcoming Kant’s problematic dualism. Given the direction that Kant himself was 
taking, success in this regard should justify Schelling’s claim that his philosophy was 
an advance over Kant’s philosophy. However, the relationship between Kant and 
Schelling is more complicated than this. While Schelling engaged with Kant and 
defined his ideas in opposition to Kant’s, his philosophy was developed as part of 
post-Kantian philosophy. He began as a disciple of Fichte, before reacting against his 
work, but remained strongly influenced by it. He was associated with the early 
Romantics, most importantly Hölderlin and Schlegel, and was influenced by Spinoza, 
Leibniz, Herder and Goethe. He was also strongly influenced by Plato’s Timaeus, and 
by Plotinus, Giordano Bruno and Jacob Böhme. And Schelling was engaged with 
work in science of his day, being strongly influenced by developmental views of Carl 
Friedrich Kielmeyer and developments in experimental science.34
While taking all this into account, I will argue here that Schelling’s rethinking of 
the whole project of philosophy was, as he himself claimed, made possible by Kant’s 
work, and the conclusions he came to can be interpreted as solutions to the aporias of 
Kant’s philosophy. However, in defending Schelling’s work in this way, it is necessary 
to understand the core ideas Schelling embraced from other philosophers, and then in 
relation to Kant, it is necessary to appreciate that those influenced by him, including 
Schelling, interpreted and evaluated his work differently than Kant understood 
himself. Kant always took mathematical physics as the quintessence of scientific 
 Furthermore, 
Schelling’s own ideas were constantly evolving. And Schelling was not only offering 
different solutions to the problems raised by Kant about the relationship between 
metaphysics, knowledge and science, but was arguing for different notions of 
metaphysics, knowledge and science.  
                                                     
33 This essentially is the argument of Di Giovanni in “Kant’s Metaphysics of Nature and Schelling’s Ideas 
for a Philosophy of Nature”. 
34 The significance of this, and the importance of Kielmeyer to Schelling, have been examined by 
Richards in The Romantic Conception of Life, 139-41, ch.6 and 298-306. See also Grant, Philosophies of Nature 
After Schelling, esp. 126-138. 
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achievement, and all his work revolved around his acceptance of its achievements. 
Fichte, however, was little interested in physics and regarded Kant’s practical 
philosophy as more important, and all his work revolved around developing this. 
While influenced by Fichte, Schelling was more interested in the nature of life and art, 
and was more influenced by the Critique of Judgment which he characterized as “Kant’s 
deepest work”.35
SCHELLING’S REWORKING OF THE IDEA OF PHILOSOPHY AND OF ITS 
RELATION TO SCIENCE 
 On this basis Schelling was prepared to challenge the significance 
accorded to Newtonian physics. While Schelling should be seen as carrying through 
Kant’s project, it needs to be appreciated that this involved a more radical rethinking 
of critical philosophy than contemplated by Kant even in his Opus Postumum. Building 
on the work of Fichte, Hölderlin and other philosophers, Schelling redefined the 
whole idea of philosophy. 
Since Schelling initially began as a disciple of Fichte, Fichte’s philosophy provides the 
best starting point to comprehend Schelling’s ideas. Fichte’s work was a development 
of Kant’s investigation into the “power of reason,” and from there, of the subject and 
intersubjectivity. Kant was responding to the fallen state of metaphysics where, from 
being seen as the “queen of the sciences” it had gone from “obsolete, worm eaten 
dogmatism, and thence into disdain.”36 Through this investigation Kant’s goal was to 
put metaphysics on “the secure path of a science” to achieve apodictic knowledge, as 
had already been accomplished for mathematics by the Greek mathematicians and 
for natural science by Bacon and Galileo, “by subjecting metaphysics to a complete 
revolution.”37
                                                     
35 Schelling, On the History of Modern Philosophy, 173; (SW I/10: 177) 
 This involved refocusing metaphysics by examining the a priori 
cognitive principles deriving from the subject itself. Fichte was unsympathetic to the 
picture Kant’s philosophy generated of a transcendental ego employing the forms of 
intuition and the categories to synthesize an atomistic manifold of sensations given to 
it by transcendental things-in-themselves. Along with other Kantians, notably K.L. 
Reinhold, he believed that Kant’s philosophy needed to be formulated more 
rigorously. He claimed that deeper knowledge of the subject provides the foundation 
that could give the required systematic unity to Kant’s philosophy, avoiding Kant’s 
dualisms while answering Jacobi’s and Schulze’s attacks on Kantian philosophy. To 
this end he sought to circumvent Jacobi’s charge of incoherence by Kant in 
postulating the thing-in-itself by dismissing any role for it, and set out to show not only 
36 Kant, “Preface [First Edition]”, Critique of Pure Reason, 6; (A viii), 7; (A x), 
37 Kant, “Preface (Second Edition]”, Critique of Pure Reason, 17 (B xii), 26 (B xxii).  
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how knowledge is possible, but also how a critique of knowledge is possible.38 
Responding to Jacobi’s critique of foundationalism as inevitably leading to an infinite 
regress of justifications in the quest to establish foundations for knowledge,39 Fichte 
argued that the absolutely first principle of all human knowledge, that can be neither 
proved nor defended, is the intuition of the capacity of the self to be aware of its own 
activity.40 This intuition is the intellectual intuition, an intuition considered as a 
possibility and then rejected by Kant as implying the possibility of knowledge of the 
noumenon,41 although he was not consistent on this. Intellectual intuition is not a 
faculty of the subject, but is the subject knowing itself and thereby constituting itself in 
a non-objective manner through mediation of what can be known objectively. Fichte 
argued that for this to be possible, the self must be unconditioned, freely positing itself, 
becoming aware of itself by opposing itself to the non-self, perceived first as a feeling 
(rather than as a sensation) of resistance to its freedom before being posited as the 
sensible world of objects limiting its free activity. Consequently, he argued for the 
priority of praxis, taking theoretical knowledge as derivative.42 It is through action 
that the sensible world is constituted as objects, and it is only on reflection that we 
develop concepts of these objects. However, Fichte also came to see that self-
consciousness and free agency are further dependent upon being recognized by and 
recognizing other finite rational beings and ascribing efficacy to them. “No Thou, no 
I: no I, no Thou” he proclaimed.43 These others, in defining oneself also limit one by 
demanding respect for their freedom.44
                                                     
38 See J.G. Fichte, The Science of Knowledge [1794] ed. and trans. Peter Heath and John Lachs (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1982), 55-62; (Ge I:483-91). Fichte is difficult to interpret. See for instance 
Robert Pippin, “Fichte’s Alleged Subjective Idealism”, in The Reception of Kant’s Critical Philosophy: Fichte, 
Schelling, & Hegel, ed. Sally Sedgwick, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 147-170. I have 
tried to present Fichte’s core ideas while avoiding these problems.  
 Fichte rejected Kant’s method of 
transcendental deduction of the categories, arguing for a constructivist or “speculative 
dialectical” approach by which the categories are deduced through a genetic account 
39 On this, see Manfred Frank, The Philosophical Foundations of Early German Romanticism, trans. Elizabeth 
Millán-Zaibert (New York: S.U.N.Y. Press, 2004), 204-5.  
40 Fichte, The Science of Knowledge, 93-97; (Ge. I:91-96). 
41 Immanuel Kant, “On the form and principles of the sensible and intelligible world [Inaugural 
dissertation]” [1770], Theoretical Philosophy 1755-1770, trans. and ed. David Walford and Ralf Meerbote 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), §10, 389; (Ak. 2:396), and Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 
196; (B 159). 
42 Fichte, The Science of Knowledge, 259; (Ge. I:294-5) & 61; (Ge. I:490) (Second Introduction). 
43 The Science of Knowledge, 172-3; (Ge I:189). 
44 J.G. Fichte, Foundations of Natural Right According to the Principles of the Wissenschaftslehre, ed. Frederick 
Neuhauser, trans. Michael Baur, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 29; (FW 3:30, §3). It 
was on the basis of this insight that Fichte reworked Kant’s practical philosophy. 
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of the structure of empirical consciousness from the postulate of the original self, the 
original, though derivative, nonself, and other selves.  
Schelling, who shared Fichte’s critical attitude to the original formulation of 
Kant’s philosophy,45 took over from Fichte the view that the subject is activity that 
can be appreciated as such through intellectual intuition, that primordial experience is 
feeling rather than sensation, that objects of the sensible world can only be understood 
in relation to the activity of the subject, that conceptual knowledge is derivative from 
practical engagement in the sensible world, that there can be and is also an 
appreciation of other subjects as activities rather than objects, and that the formation 
of the self-conscious self is the outcome of the limiting of its activity by the world and 
other subjects. Schelling also took over and further developed Fichte’s defense of 
construction and his genetic, dialectical approach to construction. He defended an 
even stronger thesis against Kant’s effort in “The Discipline of Pure Reason” in The 
Critique of Pure Reason to limit construction to mathematics,46 arguing that “the 
philosopher looks soley to the act of construction itself, which is an absolutely internal 
thing.”47
Schelling’s divergence from Fichte revolved around his acceptance of Hölderlin’s 
argument that not even mutual recognition could account for self-consciousness. 
Consciousness and its object presupposes a whole of which subject and object are 
parts. Hölderlin characterized this as “Being”.
  
48
                                                     
45 See F.W.J. Schelling, Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature, trans. Errol E. Harris and Peter Heath, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988), 25-27; (PN 32-35). 
 To accommodate this argument 
Schelling attempted to complement Fichte’s philosophy with a Philosophy of Nature 
that took nature as the source of both subjects and objects. However, there was 
something more to Hölderlin’s argument, a questioning of the primacy accorded 
knowledge in philosophy, since knowledge presupposes a separation dividing that 
46 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 677-82; (A725-32 / B753-60).  
47 F.W.J. Schelling, “The Organ of Transcendental Philosophy”, System of Transcendental Idealism (1800), 
trans. Peter Heath (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1978), §4, 13; (SW I/3:350). This point is 
examined in Alberto Toscano, “Philosophy and the Experience of Construction”, in The New Schelling, ed. 
Judith Norman and Alisdair Welchman (London: Continuum, 2004), ch.5 and in Mircea Radu, “Justus 
Grassmann’s Contributions to the Foundations of Mathematics: Mathematical and Philosophical 
Aspects”, Historia Mathematica, 27 (2000): 4-35. It is also shown here how Justus and Hermann Grassmann 
developed mathematics on the basis of Schelling’s arguments against Kant.  On this, see also, Marie-
Luise Heuser, “The Significance of Naturphilosophie for Justus and Hermann Grassmann” and Michael 
Otte, “Justus and Hermann Grassmann: philosophy and mathematics”, in H.-J. Petsche, From Past to 
Future: Grassmann’s Work in Context, ed. H.-J. Petsche et.al., (Basel: Springer, 2011), 49-59 & 61-70. 
48 See Friedrich Hölderlin, “Judgment and Being”, Essays and Letters on Theory, trans. Thomas Pfau (New 
York: State University of New York Press, 1988), 37. 
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which is to be known from the knower.49 It is this, outside of which there is nothing 
and which is prior to all oppositions, that Schelling took to be the Unconditioned or 
the “Absolute”, or “Being Itself”, the condition of everything that is. As such, it 
cannot be known either as a subject or as an object, since these assume division. The 
Absolute is the source of both subject and object, the I and the not-I, consciousness 
and the world. This extension of Fichte’s notion of constructive activity or 
productivity of the self-positing “I” beyond relations to others to the whole of nature 
was achieved by synthesizing Fichte’s account of the development of consciousness 
with Goethe’s work on the constructive activity in the metamorphosis of plants. 
Goethe had shown how not only individual plants but the whole of the plant kingdom 
is in a process of metamorphosis involving creative productivity that can be 
understood. Accepting this allowed Schelling to contextualize the constructive activity 
engendering consciousness as part of the constructive process of the whole of nature. 
Further influenced by Erasmus Darwin, Schelling then characterized this as part of 
the evolution of the whole of nature. This synthesis of Fichte and Goethe was first 
attempted in On the World Soul published in 1798 where an evolutionary view of nature 
is presented, but significantly revised under Goethe’s influence in First Outline of a 
System of the Philosophy of Nature where a more thoroughgoing naturalism was 
developed.50
While this development in Schelling’s thought suggests the impossibility of 
objective knowledge of the Absolute, Schelling still upheld the value of systematic 
thought, but accepted that it might be impossible achieve a totally coherent system. 
As Schlegel argued, system is impossible, but necessary; we have to accept both.
     
51 
Schlegel also had suggested a solution to the problem of foundations for knowledge. 
Instead of foundations, philosophy should embrace a circular form of argumentation 
in which a number of principles are mutually conditions for each other.52
                                                     
49 On this, see Andrew Bowie, Aesthetics and Subjectivity from Kant to Nietzsche, 2nd ed. (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2003), 82-3. 
 Schelling 
embraced this idea, concluding, “A system is completed when it is led back to its 
50 See Dalia Nassar,”From a Philosophy of Self to a Philosophy of Nature: Goethe and the Development 
of Schelling’s Naturphilosophie”, Achive für Geschichte der Philosophie, 92, 2010: 304-321. On Goethe’s notion of 
metamorphosis and its background, see Gabrielle Bersier, “Visualizing Carl Friedrich Kielmeyer’s 
Organic Forces: Goethe’s Morphology on the Threshold of Evolution”, Monatshefte, 97(1) 2005: 18-32. 
51 As Friedrich Schlegel put it in the “Athenaeum Fragments” no. 53, “It’s equally fatal for the mind to 
have a system and to have none. It will simply have to decide to combine the two.”  Philosophical Fragments, 
trans. Peter Firchow (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), 24. 
52 On this, see Frank, “On the Origin of Schlegel’s Talk of a Wechselerweis and His Move Away from a 
Philosophy of First Principles”, The Philosophical Foundations of Early German Romanticism, Lecture 11. 
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starting point.”53 He developed a system of Natural Philosophy consistent with 
Transcendental Idealism (by making “the objective primary” and deriving “the 
subjective from that”), and a system of Transcendental Idealism consistent with a 
Philosophy of Nature (by “proceeding from the subjective, as primary and absolute, and having 
the objective arise from this”).54 Belying the usual characterization of Schelling as an 
Idealist, Schelling noted in his System of Transcendental Idealism that “Nature … would 
exist, even if there were nothing that is aware of it.” Soon after, in Universal Deduction of 
the Dynamical Processes where Schelling attempted a “dynamic construction of matter”, 
he argued that the Philosophy of Nature is more fundamental than Idealism,55 and in 
the third version of The Ages of the World written circa 1815 he characterized Idealism as 
the philosophy of people who had dissociated themselves from the forces that are not 
only the basis of their existence, but “the foundation of all greatness and beauty.” 
They have become “people who are nothing but images, just dreams of shadows.”56
In developing these arguments, Schelling developed a new notion of metaphysics 
and of its relation to science. To begin with, he identified a different form of 
metaphysics than either the “dogmatising” metaphysics that Kant and Fichte had 
rejected, or the new “immanent” metaphysics Kant had defended, and glorified the 
speculative courage of earlier metaphysicians.
  
57
                                                     
53 Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism (1800), 232; (SW I/3:628-29). The development of this circular 
epistemology by Hegel has been examined by Tom Rockmore in Hegel’s Circular Epistemology 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986). Although it contains a discussion of Schelling, it really 
only evaluates Hegel’s epistemology and the criticisms directed against this are less relevant to Schelling 
who rejected the possibility of achieving certainty. Schelling’s “circle” is more an endless spiral. 
 Later, Schelling charged Kant with 
unintentionally defending the metaphysics he purported to oppose, and by separating 
the “negative” (the study of concepts as the conditions for knowing) from the 
“positive” (investigation of the facts of existence and the contingencies of historical 
54 Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism (1800), 7; (SW I/3:342-43). 
55 F. Schelling, “Allgemeine Deduktion des dynamischen Processes oder der Kategorien der Physik”, (SW 
I/4:1-78).  
56 Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism (1800), 5 (SW I/3:338-40), and F.W.J. Schelling, The Ages of the 
World, Third Version (c.1815), trans. Jason W. Wirth (New York: State University of New York Press, 2000), 
106; (SW I/8:343/342). On the prioritizing of the Philosophy of Nature, see Beiser, German Idealism, 489.  
In 1809 Schelling argued that idealism is inadequate for characterizing human freedom, being only 
capable of a formal conception, not “not the real and vital conception of freedom … that … is a 
possibility of good and evil.” Schelling: Of Human Freedom, trans. James Gutmann (Chicago: Open Court, 
1936), 26; (SW I/7:352). 
57 F.W.J. Schelling, Bruno or On the Natural and the Divine Principle of Things,[1802] ed. and trans. Michael G. 
Vater (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984). See especially the translator’s introduction, 
“The Revival of Metaphysics”. Schelling criticized Kant’s limited appreciation of the history of and 
different kinds of metaphysics in On the History of Modern Philosophy, 103; (SW I/10: 85). 
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emergence), allowed a form of positivism to emerge which gave no place to 
metaphysics.58 Returning to Plato and Bruno, although from a perspective that took 
as its point of departure Kant’s critical philosophy, he defended a form of speculative 
metaphysics through which we generalize features of experience to frame a 
comprehensive account of all domains of reality in terms of these generalized 
features.59
This view of metaphysics was advanced by developing Fichte’s notion of 
intellectual intuition and dialectical thinking as a development of and successor to 
Kant’s transcendental logic to derive and defend categories, and as a complement to 
art and mathematics as means to comprehend being and what exists.
  
60
                                                     
58 Schelling, On the History of Modern Philosophy, 95; (SW I/10 74-5) Schelling expanded on this argument in 
The Grounding of Positive Philosophy: The Berlin Lectures, trans. Bruce Matthews (New York: State University of 
New York Press, 2007), 113-26; (SW II/3:34-54). 
 Schelling saw 
far greater potential in intellectual intuition than Fichte had contemplated. Like 
Fichte, Schelling saw intellectual intuition as providing knowledge of one’s noumenal 
self, but criticized Fichte for having begun with the highest “potential” of nature, the 
self-conscious I, without investigating its unconscious preconditions. Schelling saw 
self-knowledge as knowledge the whole of nature acting through one-self, understood 
as part of nature. In On the True Concept of Naturphilosophie and the Correct Way to Solve its 
Problems, Schelling argued that philosophy must subtract from this highest potential to 
find the lowest potential of nature, the pure subject-object (=nature) and then 
59 Schelling kept coming back to the notion of metaphysics and never completely clarified his own 
conception of it. He was suspicious of the medieval interpretation of metaphysics as the science 
examining what lay beyond experience, noting in his Berlin lectures that the word “metaphysics” might 
not have come from Aristotle himself. He explained the transformations in the concept of metaphysics 
that led to Kant’s notion of metaphysics, then characterized his own approach as “metaphysical 
empiricism” (Schelling, The Grounding of Positive Philosophy, 171; (SW II/3:115). This would be appropriate 
for Schelling’s early philosophy in which he was centrally concerned with science, but by this stage of his 
career Schelling was focusing on theology.  
60 The evolution of Schelling’s notion of intellectual intuition and its relation to knowledge and dialectics 
has been analysed by Arthur S. Dewing in “The Significance of Schelling’s Theory of Knowledge”, The 
Philosophical Review, 19(2) (March 1910): 154-167, an analysis only slightly marred by the author’s 
assumption that Schelling was an idealist. For a brief characterization of Schelling’s notion of dialectics, 
see “On the Study of Philosophy” in On University Studies, trans. E.S. Moran, Athens, Ohio: Ohio 
University Press, 1966, ch.6. On the relationship between transcendental deduction and dialectics as 
conceived by Hegel, see the chapters on Kant and Hegel in Z. Zvie Bar-On, The Categories and the Principle 
of Coherence: Whitehead’s Theory of Categories in Historical Perspective (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987). 
Schelling’s notion of dialectics is not considered here. However, although Whitehead does not use the 
notion “dialectics”, his speculative approach to developing categories has much in common with 
Schelling’s approach.  
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reconstruct the path upward to the self-conscious I.61 Through the reconstruction of 
this upward path we can then gain knowledge of the individual subject as a member 
of a whole “seeing how its essential nature or inner identity depends on the totality of 
which it is only a part.”62 Such intellectual intuition is required to comprehend that 
“which is absolutely mobile … which cannot be held onto for a moment”, which 
cannot be grasped “as a real object of thought; for by ‘object’ one understand 
something which keeps still.”63 That is, it is required to comprehend process, and 
Schelling claimed that his system introduced into philosophy “the concept of process 
and of the moments of this process.”64
Analysis of these dynamic, holistic processes required a new kind of thinking.
 Intellectual intuition provided a new kind of 
holistic comprehension (or “contemplation”), different from the comprehension of 
mechanistic causation that Kant had assumed to be the only valid form of 
explanation. 
65 
For dialectical thinking as it was developed by Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, 
“subjectivity and objectivity, of both mind and the encompassing world of nature, are 
mutually implicating aspects of a single, comprehensive system.”66 While Schelling 
concurred with Fichte and Hegel on this, in opposition to their dialectics in which 
logically implicit contents are progressively unfolded, Schelling developed a form of 
dialectics that requires thought to confront causal influences from what exists as well 
as to draw inferences (although Schelling appeared to depart from this view for a time 
with his Philosophy of Identity).67
                                                     
61 Schelling, (SW I/4:84). 
 For Schelling, thought is inherently synthetic, and 
begins with genuine opposition either between thought and something opposing it, or 
other factors within thought. This necessitates a new synthetic moment that can be 
treated as a product or factor in the next level of development. Schelling described the 
task of his new “method” as: “to explain the idea of an objective world which was 
absolutely independent of our freedom, indeed which limits this freedom, by a process 
62 As Beiser put it in German Idealism, 580. 
63 Schelling, On the History of Modern Philosophy, 152; (SW I/10: 150) 
64 Schelling, On the History of Modern Philosophy, 130; (SW I/10: 120). 
65 As Kant acknowledged. See, Critique of Judgment, §78, 295; (Ak 5:410). 
66 Edward A. Beach, “The Later Schelling’s Conception of Dialectical Method, in Contradistinction to 
Hegel’s”, The Owl of Minerva, 22(1) (Fall 1990): 35-54, 36. 
67 On the difference between Hegel’s and Schelling’s dialectics, see Edward Allen Beach, The Potencies of 
God(s): Schelling’s Philosophy of Mythology (New York: State University of New York Press), 84-91. On this 
change in direction, see Beiser, German Idealism, 563. Schelling distanced himself from the philosophy of 
identity in On the History of Modern Philosophy, 120 (SW I/10: 105) and his later attack on purely “negative 
philosophy” and defence of “positive philosophy” signified his rejection of the kind of reasoning 
associated with identity philosophy.  
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in which the I sees itself as unintentionally but necessarily engaged, precisely through 
the act of self-positing.”68 This form of dialectics does not reduce Nature to either law 
governed matter or “nothing more than the organ of self-consciousness” but affirms 
that “[t]he first maxim of all true natural science, to explain everything by the forces 
of nature, is therefore accepted in its widest extent in our science.”69 Building on 
Kant’s ascription of a central place to imagination in synthesis and the place Kant 
had accorded to “feeling of life” in the Critique of Judgment,70 Schelling’s dialectic 
involves a reflective and imaginative experimentation and reconstruction of the 
sequence of forms produced by a procreative causality of the Unconditioned or 
Absolute, a process that has produced opposing forces, matter, extension, inner sense 
and sensory objects, causation, space and time, organisms, humanity and our present 
consciousness. The constructions of mathematics are a special instance of such 
synthetic activity, and in “On Construction in Philosophy” Schelling offered far 
reaching revisions of Kant’s philosophy of mathematics based on this revised notion 
of construction, revisions which inspired the work of Justus and Hermann 
Grassmann.71 Since construction reveals the “necessary” as thought is compelled by 
the real, Schelling claimed that such philosophizing about nature “means as much as 
to create it.”72 What Schelling was providing was a “naturalization of the 
transcendental” and a “hermeneutics of nature.”73
                                                     
68 Schelling, On the History of Modern Philosophy, 111; (SW I/10: 96). 
 Intellectual intuition had been 
extended from understanding the development of consciousness to understanding the 
development of the cosmos and humanity as the conditions for the emergence of 
69 F.W.J. Schelling, “Introduction to the Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature, Or, On the 
Concept of Speculative Physics and the Internal Organization of System of this Science”, First Outline of a 
System of the Philosophy of Nature, trans. Keith R. Petersen, (New York: SUNY Press, 2004), 194-5; (We 
7:273). 
70 See Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 169; (A123) where Kant argues the imagination provides the “necessary 
unity in the synthesis of appearance”, which he characterized as “the transcendental function of the 
imagination.” See also 191; (B151-2), Critique of Judgment, §1, 1; (Ak 5: 204).  
71 F.W. Schelling, “Über die Konstruktion in der Philosophie”, Kritisches Journal der Philosophie (1802-1803), 
(SW I 5: 125-151). On the influence of this work on mathematics and the philosophy of mathematics, see 
Mircea Radu, “Justus Grassmann’s Contributions to the Foundations of Mathematics: Mathematical and 
Philosophical Aspects”, Historia Mathematica, 27 (2000): 4-35, Hans-Joachim Petsche, Hermann Grassmann: 
Biography, trans. Mark Minnes, (Basel: Birkhäuser, 2009), Albert C. Lewis, “H. Grassmann’s 1844 
Ausdehnungslehre and Schleiermacher’s Dialektik”, Annals of Science, 34(2) (1977): 103-162, Albert C. Lewis 
“Unity of Logic, Pedagogy and Foundations in Grassmann’s Mathematical Work”, History and Philosophy 
of Logic, 25, (Feb. 2004): 15-36 and the papers by Marie-Luise Heuser. 
72 Schelling, First Outline, 5; (We 7: 67).  
73 See Grant, Philosophies of Nature After Schelling, 119 (on “the naturalization of the transcendental”) and 
Andrew Bowie, “The Hermeneutics of Nature”, Schelling and Modern European Philosophy (London: 
Routledge, 1993), ch.2. 
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individual consciousness. As such, Schelling was concerned not only to show the 
cognitive conditions for objective knowledge, but the nature of the world that enables 
it to be known objectively, and to produce beings which could achieve objective 
knowledge of it and of themselves.  
Through dialectical construction, intellectual intuition enables the universal and 
the particular, the ideal and the real, to be grasped, conforming to Kant’s dictum that 
the mind can only know what it constructs while avoiding the problem raised by 
Maimon against Kant that he had no way of showing how to apply synthetic a priori 
principles to experience.74 However, Schelling did not believe that the deployment of 
such thinking by itself would guarantee the truth of his system of philosophy. 
Dialectics extends from thoughts of individuals to the thoughts of others and to the 
relationship between philosophies and philosophical systems. Philosophy, he believed, 
advances as less perfect forms of philosophy are discarded and their valuable contents 
assimilated to more perfect forms.75 Systems are required to hold insights together, 
but they are always provisional. Unlike Fichte, who believed that in systematizing 
Kant he had provided the final foundation for all philosophy and was appalled by 
Schelling’s essay of 1801 presenting his views as “my system of philosophy”,76 
Schelling thought philosophers should develop their own systems, knowing that no 
system could be final. In fact, a final, perfect system would be the death of philosophy 
and the death of spirit.77 A system should be judged according to its coherent and 
comprehensive account of everything, and its capacity to surpass by including more 
limited philosophical stances. It is only through providing a history of philosophy that 
defines its claim to truth as proposed solutions to the problems raised by the work of 
other philosophers that a system can be properly defended. This involves 
reconstructing the history of philosophy, revealing its achievements and failings and 
showing the logic of its progress to the position being defended, which Schelling later 
attempted to do.78 Consequently, Schelling claimed that the categories of thought are 
not eternal but progressively emerge in the course of real history.79
                                                     
74 On this, see Beiser, German Idealism, 580-2. 
 This means the 
75 Schelling, Bruno, 203; (SW I/4:307-8) 
76 F.W.J. Schelling, “Presentation of my System of Philosophy (1801)”, trans. Michael G. Vater, The 
Philosophical Forum, XXXII(4) (Winter, 2001): 339-371. For Fichte’s response to this, see Beiser, German 
Idealism, 502. 
77 “Philosphische Briefe über Dogmatismus und Criticismus” SW I/1:306. On this, see Bruce Matthews, 
“Translator’s Introduction”, Schelling, The Grounding of Positive Philosophy, 3. 
78 Schelling described his dialectical method in On the History of Modern Philosophy in the Preface, 41 (SW 
I/10:3) and111-2 (SW I/10:106). 
79 On this, see Thomas Seebohm, “Schelling’s ‘Kantian’ Critique of Hegel’s Deduction of Categories”, 
Clio 8(2) (1979): 239-255. 
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categories presently dominating cannot be assumed to be beyond questioning, and 
Schelling believed that philosophers should be prepared to offer new categories to 
overcome the limitations of prevailing categories.  
This notion of metaphysics implied an abandonment of the quest for apodictic 
knowledge that had dominated Kant’s and Fichte’s philosophies and a more intimate 
relation between metaphysics and natural science than Kant had contemplated.80 To 
begin with, Schelling argued that science presupposes metaphysics not as a guarantor 
for natural science, but as a condition for science. Following Kant’s observation on 
experimentation in the second preface to the Critique of Pure Reason, Schelling accepted 
that science is not based on passive observation, but proceeds through our freedom to 
act to invade Nature and compel it to act under certain conditions, that is, to perform 
experiments.81 “Every experiment is a question put to Nature, to which it is compelled 
to reply” Schelling proclaimed. “But every question contains an implicit a priori 
judgment; every experiment that is an experiment, is a prophecy; experimenting itself 
is a production of the phenomena.”82 Such questions ultimately are dependent on the 
synthetic judgments of metaphysics. However, Schelling ridiculed the idea that 
natural science must be able to deduce all its principles a priori, arguing that “we 
originally know nothing at all except through experience, and by means of experience, and in this 
sense the whole of our knowledge consists of judgments of experience.”83 He argued 
that the distinction between a priori and a posteriori “is a distinction made solely with 
respect to our knowing, and the kind of our knowledge of these judgments, so that every 
judgment which is merely historical for me – i.e., a judgment of experience – 
becomes, notwithstanding, an a priori principle as soon as I arrive, whether directly or 
indirectly, at insight into its internal necessity.”84 This observation is applicable not 
only to particular sciences, but to metaphysics as such. In opposition to Kant’s 
proclamation that “Metaphysics is a speculative cognition by reason that is wholly 
isolated and rises entirely above being instructed by experience,”85
                                                     
80 As Kant wrote in his “Metaphysical Foundations for Natural Science”, “Only that whose certainty is 
apodeictic can be called science proper” 4; (Ak 4:468). 
 Schelling argued 
that the synthetic a priori knowledge of metaphysics is arrived at through dialectical 
construction which must engage with experience, and is not apodictic, but is fallible 
and subject to falsification and revision or replacement. Arguing against the 
assumption that philosophical arguments should have the apodictic quality of 
81 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 19; (B xiii). 
82 Schelling, “Introduction”, First Outline, 197; (We 7 :276). 
83 Schelling, “Introduction”, First Outline, 198; (We 7:278). 
84 Schelling, “Introduction”, First Outline, 198; (We 7:278). 
85 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 20 (B xiv). 
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mathematics, he claimed that only when the possibility of doubt is present do we have 
“real knowledge”.86 He argued that an “absolute hypothesis must bear its necessity 
within itself, but it must besides this, be brought to an empirical test; for inasmuch as all 
the phenomena of Nature cannot be deduced from this hypothesis as long as there is in the whole system 
of Nature a single phenomenon which is not necessary according to that principle, or which contradicts 
it, the hypothesis is thereby at once shown to be false, and from that moment ceases to have 
validity as a hypothesis.”87 At the same time, Schelling allowed for a form of natural 
necessity in nature other than the necessity grasped through mathematics, the only 
necessity allowed by Kant who maintained that “in every special doctrine of nature 
only so much science proper can be found as there is mathematics in it.”88
SCHELLING’S NATURPHILOSOPHIE 
  
With this different conception of metaphysics Schelling attempted to develop a system 
that would overcome the problems of all previous systems while encompassing within 
it all their achievements. Pre-eminently, he was concerned to overcome the problems 
of Kant’s system of philosophy without abandoning the new dimensions opened by 
Kant’s focus on the conditions for knowledge. However, situating this historically, 
Schelling saw the dualism in Kant’s philosophy as an echo of the deeper and more 
problematic dualism introduced into philosophy by Descartes.89
In accordance with his revised notion of metaphysics, Schelling took the 
conception of organism presented by Kant in the Critique of Judgment as the point of 
departure for reconceptualizing the totality of being to make the evolution of life and 
consciousness within the physical world intelligible. Rejecting Kant’s distinction laid 
out in this critique between judgments of nonliving and living beings, Schelling 
argued that all natural products should be conceived as organized wholes. Mind is 
 Not only did he see 
the conception of the subject struggling to know the world as a further development of 
Descartes’ cogito, but saw the source of this conception of the subject and the 
problematic status of knowledge in a physical world as due to the mechanistic view of 
physical existence. While nature was conceived in a way that made it amenable to 
mathematical analysis, this rendered life, consciousness and freedom unintelligible. 
To address this problem he concluded that it is necessary not merely to circumscribe 
the validity of the Newtonian conception of physical existence as Kant had done, but 
to challenge and replace it.  
                                                     
86 On this see Matthews, “Translators Introduction”, Schelling, The Grounding of Positive Philosophy, 77-8.  
87 Schelling, “Introduction”, First Outline, 197-8; (We 7:277). 
88 Kant, “Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science”, 6; (Ak 4:470). 
89 This was only fully spelt out in Schelling’s History of Modern Philosophy. 
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highly organized, while matter is relatively unorganized. This characterization of 
nature was not regulative but constitutive. However, Schelling did far more than 
defend an organic view of nature, as some of his interpreters have argued.90 He 
developed a process metaphysics which could account for both the emergence of 
relatively inert matter, nonliving organization associated with chemistry, living 
organisms and consciousness. It was through construing mind as a function of 
organisms active in nature and developing their consciousness as active agents that it 
could be assumed by Schelling that cognition grasps nature as such rather than the 
appearance of nature. Parallel to Kant’s work in the Opus postumum, Schelling offered 
a solution to his problematic dualism and an account of the diversity of “objects” or 
beings while avoiding Fichte’s “subjective idealism”. So radical were his proposals in 
this regard that other interpreters of Schelling argued that this led Schelling to break 
completely with critical philosophy. Iain Hamilton Grant, for instance, suggested that 
“an exposition of Schellingianism … entails the systematic undoing of the critical 
revolution.”91 This view is clearly mistaken. Schelling stated in the Berlin lectures 
1842-43 that “I most definitely have to dispute the opinion that any position can be 
advanced that is completely removed from a connection to Kant” and argued that the 
study of philosophy must begin with Kant.92
Schelling’s main works on the Philosophy of Nature, his Ideas for a Philosophy of 
Nature first published in 1797 (and then in revised form in 1803), On the World Soul 
published in 1798, First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature published in 1799, 
Universal Deduction of the Dynamical Processes published in 1800 and On the True Concept of 
Naturphilosphie and the Correct Way to Solve its Problems in 1801 were presented as 
supplements to Fichte’s philosophy, although the last two, claiming that the 
Philosophy of Nature had primacy over transcendental philosophy, marked a break 
with Fichte. Meeting Hölderlin’s criticisms of Fichte’s philosophy did not involve 
rejecting Fichte’s genetic constructivism, but, as we have seen, applying this approach 
to the whole of Nature. Nature is not posited as that which is to be known, Schelling 
argued, but as Being Itself which we cannot avoid presupposing. As he proclaimed: “It 
is not, therefore, that WE KNOW Nature as a priori, but Nature IS a priori.”
  
93
                                                     
90 See for instance Frederick C. Beiser, “Kant and the Naturphilosophen”, The Romantic Imperative: The Concept 
of Early German Romanticism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), ch.9 and Richards, The Romantic 
Conception of Life, ch.8.   
 Not only 
is the self activity positing itself and coming to be through limiting itself and being 
limited, the whole of Nature is unconditioned activity developing through limiting 
91 Iain Hamilton Grant, Philosophies of Nature After Schelling (London: Continuum, 2006), 6. 
92 Schelling, The Grounding of Positive Philosophy, 110-1; (SW II/3: 32) 
93 Schelling, “Introduction”, First Outline, 198; (We 7:279). 
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itself. This is the central thesis offered by Schelling in order to explain the creativity of 
nature and the diversity of its products. As he further proclaimed, “[B]eing itself is 
nothing other than the constructing itself, or since construction is thinkable at all only as 
activity, being itself is nothing other than the highest constructing activity, which, although 
never itself an object, is the principle of everything objective.”94 This unconditioned 
activity cannot be analysed but has to be accepted as the condition of everything else. 
As Schelling put it: “[T]his absolutely productive character (which no longer has a 
substrate, but is rather the cause of every substrate) is that which absolutely blocks all 
analysis; precisely for that reason, is the point at which our analysis (experience) can 
never arrive.”95 It is the apparent stable products which need to be explained, and 
these are explained through activity limiting itself. As Schelling noted, “The chief 
problem of the philosophy of nature is not to explain the active in Nature (for, 
because it is its first supposition, this is quite conceivable to it), but the resting, 
permanent. Philosophy of Nature arrives at this explanation simply by virtue of the 
presupposition that for Nature the permanent is a limitation of its own activity.”96 
The whole of Nature is “an ever-becoming product” in constant formation, in which 
“everything must engage in that universal process of formation.”97 Products have a 
derivative status. As Schelling put it, “If Nature is absolute activity … Nature EXISTS 
nowhere as product; all individual productions in Nature are merely apparent products…”98 Any 
individual being is something having already become, and like a whirlpool that forms 
in a stream when it encounters resistance,99 should be viewed “as a determinate form 
or limitation of the originary activity.”100 As such it is never merely fixed but “is 
reproduced at each instant through the force of nature entire.”101
Schelling deployed his dialectical method to show how this constructive activity 
could generate different kinds of existents. That is, from the dualism of productivity 
and products generated through the limiting of activity, he set out to derive “a 
dynamic graded series of stages in Nature.”
  
102
                                                     
94 Schelling, First Outline, 78; (We 7: 13-4). 
 In The First Outline of a System of the 
Philosophy of Nature he defended “dynamic atomism” in which the simplest factors are 
95 Schelling, First Outline, 5; (We 7: 67). 
96 Schelling, First Outline, 17; (We 7: 82).  
97 Schelling, First Outline, 28; (We 7: 93). 
98 Schelling, First Outline, 16; (We 7: 81). 
99 Schelling uses this example to illustrate his meaning in First Outline, 18n.; (We 7: 82n.). 
100 Schelling, First Outline, 13-4; (We 7: 78).   
101 Schelling, First Outline, 18n;. (We 7: 82n.). 
102 Schelling, First Outline, 53; (We 7: 117). Also, see Schelling, On the History of Modern Philosophy, 111-2 and 
142-3; (SW I/10: 96f. and 136) where he contrasts his notion of dialectics with Hegel’s. 
 COSMOS AND HISTORY 49 
“originary actants” or “originary productivities”.103 A multiplicity of actants 
reciprocally restrict themselves (prehending each other) to effect the unity of a product 
without ceasing to be a multiplicity.104 However, a product cannot be accounted for 
through these actants; rather, “the constituents are given through the product.”105 (In 
the General Deduction of the Dynamic Process Schelling took “dynamic process” as the basal 
unit, stating that “the same phenomena that we conceive under the term ‘dynamic 
process’, and which are the only primitives of nature, are nothing other than 
consistent self-construction of matter, simply repeated at different stages.”106) From 
opposed tendencies of activities coming into conflict and limiting each other, 
Schelling argued, we get the polarity of opposing forces, matter (resulting from a 
balance of forces), extensity (associated with magnetism, electricity and chemistry), 
nonliving organization and living organisms, different kinds of organisms, and 
mind.107 Schelling proclaimed: “Philosophy … is nothing other than a natural history of 
our mind.”108 Construction of these stages was not meant to trace the actual, empirical 
or experiential awareness of the stages of development, but to determine the necessary 
“conditions of possibility” of the experience of the objective world. In the System of 
Transcendental Idealism Schelling argued that such construction is driven by the 
persistent efforts of the subject to become an object to itself in the process of making 
its way to higher levels of consciousness.109 In this way nested spheres of activity are 
generated. Later, along with affirming the priority of the Philosophy of Nature over 
Transcendental Philosophy, he rejected this idea of evolution as too 
anthropocentric,110
                                                     
103 Schelling, First Outline, 21n.; (We 7: 86*). 
 but still retained the idea of evolution of emergent levels with each 
level being the potential (or potency) for development to the higher levels. Through 
sketching these stages of evolution, Schelling presented the categories of natural 
ontology and epistemology, deploying the least number of concepts required to 
provide a general account of the world and experience. These are the concepts that 
104 Schelling, First Outline, 24-5; (We 7: 88f.). 
105 Schelling, First Outline, 24n.; (We 7:  88*). 
106 Schelling, “Allgemeine Deduktion der dynamischen Processes” SW  I/4:4, trans. and quoted by 
Grant, Philosophies of Nature After Schelling, 170. 
107 See Schelling, First Outline, 53-70; (We 7:117-34). and 141-158; (We 7:210-30) and “Allgemeine Deduktion 
der dynamischen Processes” SW 1/4:31. 
108 Schelling, Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature, 30; (PN 41). 
109 Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism (1800), 2; (SW I/3:330-32) and Schelling, Ideas for a Philosophy of 
Nature, 41-2 (Introduction) & 272-3 (Concluding Note); (PN 63-4 & 491-2). 
110 Schelling, “Allgemeine Deduktion der dynamischen Processes” SW I/4:1-78, 3, and F.W.J. Schelling, 
The Grounding of Positive Philosophy: The Berlin Lectures, trans. Bruce Mathews, (New York: S.U.N.Y. Press, 
2007), 92-4; (SW II/3:5-7). 
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enable us to think nature and experience and to provide a genetic account of both 
subjects and objects from a single source, and to characterize all the different kinds of 
beings within nature, including living organisms and humanity with the capacity to 
create institutions and reconstruct the evolutionary production of Nature. 
ORGANIZATION, ORGANISMS AND LIFE 
Having denied that there is a difference in kind between reflective judgments of 
purpose in organisms or nature as a whole and determinative judgments of 
supposedly simple bodies, Schelling accorded a more central place to the study of life 
in this dialectic than it occupied in Kant’s philosophical system. An account of living 
organisms was required which could justify the notion of humanity as a physical 
product of Nature able to act freely and comprehend Nature, and the notion of 
physical existence had to be modified accordingly. Schelling was also concerned to 
acknowledge the value of life apart from its usefulness to humans, and to acknowledge 
that life preexisted humans, and that in the future it could continue without 
humans.111 In characterizing life he was strongly influenced by §64 and §65 of the 
Critique of Judgment where Kant characterized and defined organic bodies as bodies in 
which the parts “combine into the unity of a whole because they are reciprocally 
cause and effect of their form” and “the idea of the whole should conversely 
(reciprocally) determine the form and combination of all the parts”.112 An organism 
then is “both an organized and a self-organized being” in which the parts produce each 
other both in their form and in their combination.113
                                                     
111 Schelling’s concern to uphold the independent value of nature was expressed in a letter to Fichte 
written on October 3rd, 1801, attacking his form of idealism. See Beiser, German Idealism, 504. Schelling 
became even more critical of this facet of Fichte’s philosophy in 1806 in “Darlegung des Wahren 
Berhältnisses der Naturphilosophie besserten Fichtschen Lehre”, SW I/7:17. Schelling’s views here also 
contrast with Kant’s who characterized all non-human beings, including animals, as things, “which we 
can dispose of as we please.” Immanuel Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, trans. Mary J. 
Gregor (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), 9; (Ak 7:127). 
 However, Kant retreated from 
the implications of his insight. In §77 he suggested that “we can conceive of an 
understanding that, unlike ours, is not discursive but intuitive, and hence proceeds 
from the synthetically universal (the intuition of a whole as a whole) to the particular, 
i.e., from the whole to the parts,” but then claimed: “Our understanding … must start 
from the parts taken as bases – which are thought of as universal – for different 
possible forms that are to be subsumed under these bases as consequences. We … can 
regard a real whole of nature only as the joint effect of the motive forces of the 
112 Critique of Judgment, §65, 252; (Ak 5:373). 
113 Critique of Judgment, §65, 253; (Ak 5:374). 
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parts.”114 He suggested that “it is not impossible for such a body to be produced 
mechanically,”115 and averred that “without mechanism we cannot gain insight into 
the nature of things.”116 The apparent contradiction between the acknowledgement of 
living beings characterized by final causes and the principle that all material things 
should be explicable through mechanical laws, characterized by Kant as the 
“antinomy of teleological judgment”, was resolved by Kant by allowing both to be 
accepted; but this meant acknowledging a new, if smaller gulf between the different 
domains of philosophy.117 For the most part, Kant argued that purpose should only be 
accepted as a regulative principle of reflective judgment; unlike mechanical laws it 
cannot be taken as constitutive of our experience, and this is generally how he has 
been interpreted.118
However, Kant was inconsistent on this. There was an undercurrent in his work 
associated with the place accorded imagination and the “feel of life” that pushed Kant 
towards a cosmology that gave a more central place to life.
  
119 In §78 of The Critique of 
Judgment he grappled with the problem and eventually privileged teleology over 
mechanism, while at the same time acknowledging the difficulty of defending this. 
Schelling rejected the subordinate place accorded to teleology, embracing Kant’s 
more radical reflections. We cannot avoid cognizing organisms as independent wholes 
in which there is unity in diversity, Schelling claimed. “Every organization is … a 
whole; its unity lies in itself; it does not depend on our choice whether we think of it as 
one or many.”120 “[Y]ou are … compelled to concede that the purposiveness of 
natural products dwells in themselves. … [It] is not merely logical … but real.”121
                                                     
114 Critique of Judgment, §77, 291-2; (Ak 5:407). 
 To 
think otherwise is a pathology of reflective thinking that can only investigate by 
separating. By contrast, the “pure intuition, or rather, the creative imagination, long 
since discovered the symbolic language, which one has only to construe in order to 
discover that Nature speaks to us the more intelligibly the less we think of her in a 
115 Critique of Judgment, §77, 293; (Ak 5:408). 
116 Critique of Judgment, §78, 295; (Ak 5:410). 
117 Critique of Judgment, §70-§78, 266-300; (Ak 5-386 – 414),  
118 For the reason why Kant took this position, and the difficulties it posed for the critical system, see John 
H. Zammito, “’This inscrutable principle of an original organization’: epigenesis and ‘looseness of fit’ in 
Kant’s philosophy of science”, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, 34(2003):73-109. 
119 Reading Kant from the perspective of Wilhelm Dilthey, Rudolf A. Makkreel in Imagination and 
Interpretation in Kant: The Hermeneutical Import of the Critique of Judgment, (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1990) has shown the increasing importance Kant accorded imagination and life, arguing that “the 
idea of life pervades the entire structure of the Critique of Judgment” (103). 
120 Schelling, Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature, 31; (PN 44). 
121 Schelling, Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature, 32;. (PN 46). 
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merely reflective way.”122 “The organic,” Schelling proclaimed, reaffirming Kant’s 
original notion of organism, “arises out of itself. … Every organic product carries the 
reason for its existence in itself, for it is cause and effect of itself. No single part could 
arise except in this whole.”123 Schelling gave a place to the concept of organization as 
an objective aspect of organization, relating the whole to the parts. A “concept lies at 
the base of every organization … [but] … this concept dwells in the organization 
itself, and can by no means be separated from it; it organizes itself, and is not simply, 
say, a work of art whose concept is to be found outside it in the understanding of the 
artist.”124 Life is self-organizing and has to be appreciated as such. Schelling rejected 
both appeals to a creator of Nature and to a life-force to account for life. “[Y]ou 
destroy all idea of Nature from the very bottom, as soon as you allow the purposiveness 
to enter her from without, through a transfer from the intelligence of any being 
whatever.”125 “Life-force” Schelling went on, “is a completely self contradictory 
concept.”126
Schelling not only claimed a central place for holistic comprehension of self-
organization through intellectual intuition and dialectics, but argued that mechanistic 
explanations are derivative and only provide a limited form of knowledge. Holistic 
thinking is required to comprehend dynamical phenomena while analytical thinking 
“never reaches a final source of motion in Nature [and] deals only with secondary 
motions, and even with the original ones only as  mechanical (and therefore likewise 
capable of mathematical construction).”
  
127 The relations between bodies studied by 
Newton and privileged by Kant were portrayed as Schelling as abstractions from 
dynamical processes, presupposing the holistic causation that produces component 
bodies in motion as relatively permanent.128 To defend holistic thinking Schelling 
argued that the “Community of Relation” in which there is a reciprocity between 
agent and patient, which Kant introduced into the second edition of the Critique of Pure 
Reason as a derivative form of causation, is basic, and cause and effect relations, which 
Kant took to be basic, are abstractions from this and derivative.129
                                                     
122 Schelling, Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature, 35; (PN 52). 
  
123 Schelling, Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature, 30-1; (PN 44)  
124 Schelling, Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature, 31; (PN 45). 
125 Schelling, Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature, 34; (PN 50). 
126 Schelling, Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature, 37; (PN 55). 
127 Schelling, First Outline, 196 (SW I/7:275). Schelling had argued this earlier in the preface to Von der 
Weltseele (1797); (SW I/2:517). On this, see Beiser, German Idealism, 516-7. 
128 Schelling, First Outline, 196; (SW I/7:275). 
129 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 132 (B 106).  Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, 110; (SW I/3:475-6). 
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Along with defending the holistic features of self-organization in life, Schelling 
also offered an account of the emergence of life and the development of sentience. 
This required further revisions of Kant’s philosophy involving a highly original 
characterization of self-organization that not only enabled Schelling to give a place to 
holistic causation, but to creativity in nature. Nature was conceived of as being able to 
generate new levels of holistic causation. These revisions were based on Schelling’s 
notion of Being Itself as self-limiting activity, a notion that clearly anticipated 
hierarchy theory (where emergence is seen to be generated through new levels of 
facilitative constraints) and other features of complexity theory.130 Essentially, in 
opposition to Kant’s view of nature as “the sum total of all things insofar as they can 
be objects of our senses and hence also objects of experience,”131 this involved seeing 
nature as a world of processes rather than things, with “things” or “products” being 
derivative. This meant that substance and accidents, or “Inherence and Subsistence”, 
basic categories in Kant’s philosophy, also have to be treated as derivative 
relationships. As Schelling wrote “Substances are nothing distinct from coexistence. 
That they are fixated as substances means that coexistence is posited, and conversely, 
coexistence is nothing else but a mutual fixating of substances by one another.”132 
Substance is “no more than the fixation of time.”133
The simplest fixation is where there is an equilibrium of forces limiting each other 
to produce objects that appear to be inert things. However, such bodies are not inert; 
chemistry had shown how these can become active under an external stimulus.
 This immediately opened the 
question of how this fixation takes place and what kinds of fixation there can be. It is 
through these revisions that Schelling was able to offer an alternative and more 
coherent solution to the problem of explaining life than Kant was able to provide. 
134 
Other forms of organization are more complex. With life, equilibrium must be 
continually disturbed, and continually reproduced.135
                                                     
130 On hierarchy theory and its significance, see see H. H. Pattee, “The Physical Basis and Origin of 
Hierarchical Control”, Hierarchy Theory: The Challenge of Complex Systems ed. Howard H. Pattee (New York: 
George Braziller, 1973), ch.4, T.F.H. Allen and Thomas B. Starr, Hierarchy: Perspectives for Ecological 
Complexity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982) and Stanley N. Salthe, Development and Evolution: 
Complexity and Change in Biology (Bradford: Cambridge, Mass., 1993), ch.2. 
 Schelling saw life being entirely 
dependent on chemical conditions, noting that “long ago, Nature made the first 
131 Kant, “Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science”, Philosophy of Material Nature, 3; (Ak 4: 467). 
132 Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, 111; (SW I/3:476-77). 
133 Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, 109; (SW I/3:473-75). 
134 Schelling, Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature, 252-3; (PN 454-5) The central place accorded to chemistry 
contrasts with Kant’s characterization of it as “systematic art rather than science” in “Metaphysical 
Foundations of Natural Science”, 4; (Ak 4:468). 
135 Schelling, First Outline, 118; (We 7:183). 
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chemical sketches in the so-called inorganic world for the formations which it 
produces in the organic.”136 Viewing Earth itself as a living organism and laying the 
foundations for ecology, Schelling argued that organic nature as a whole is dependent 
on the preservation of air circulation, maintaining that “[e]ven the atmosphere, daily 
organized anew, already contains the first impulse to universal organization.”137 
Individual organisms emerge in this context through the interaction of actants. “Each 
organism,” Schelling wrote, “is itself nothing other than the collective expression for a 
multiplicity of actants, which mutually limit themselves to a determinate sphere.” 
Here “[i]n all the lawlessness of the actants continuously jostling one another, there 
yet remains the lawful aspect of the product itself, which they, (and no others) are 
constrained among themselves to produce.” The actions generated by constraints 
necessary for such production must be seen as functions of the organism. These 
functions must balance each other, or as Schelling put it, they “must be opposed to one 
another and reciprocally maintain each other in equilibrium”138 Such a balance 
between functions is evident in the relation between organisms. The external 
condition for plants is light, which enables them to return the power of combustion to 
the atmosphere, while the animal “destroys the atmosphere about itself like the 
mobile, growing flame.”139 Within individual organisms such opposition between 
functions engenders their differentiation. As Schelling put it: “Where opposed 
functions are united in one organism, these functions must be split up into various 
organs.”140 Such an organism “is what it is … through itself – which is simultaneously 
cause and effect of itself, means and end.”141 While this accords with Kant’s 
characterization of organisms, in opposition to Kant who denied the possibility of 
explaining life through evolution, Schelling here explained life as part of a general 
theory of dynamic evolution through limiting of activity, dismissing claims against the 
possibility of such an explanation as a “vintage delusion”.142
Schelling often wrote as though all individuals are merely the effects of self-
limiting of nature as a whole, that “everything individual in [Nature] is predetermined 
  
                                                     
136 Schelling, First Outline, 57; (We 7:121). 
137 Schelling, First Outline, 58; (We 7:121). 
138 Schelling, First Outline, 51-2; (We 7:114-5). 
139 Schelling, First Outline, 59; (We 7:124). 
140 Schelling, First Outline, 52; (We 7:115). 
141 Schelling, First Outline, 51; (We 7:114). 
142 For Kant’s rejection of the possibility of explaining emergence, see Critique of Judgment, 305 (Ak 5: 419). 
On the significance of this rejection, see Richards, The Romantic Conception of Life, 233, and Zammito, The 
Genesis of Kant’s Critique of Judgment, 216-8. On Schelling’s defense of evolution, see Richards, 298. 
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by the whole or by the idea of a Nature generally.”143 However, he argued elsewhere 
that individuals could only exist by asserting themselves against the absolute. 
Accordingly, he concluded, “life must be thought of as engaged in a constant struggle 
against the course of nature, or in an endeavor to uphold its identity against the 
latter.”144 “In order that it not be assimilated,” Schelling wrote, “[the individual 
organism] must assimilate, in order that it not be organized, it must organize.  In this act 
(of opposition) inner and outer are divided for it. It is an activity that works from the inner 
toward the outer.”145 Here, outer activity generates an internal activity which counters 
the tendencies of the outer activity, thereby maintaining internal stability. Organisms 
respond to changes in their environment to form and reform themselves. Clearly, 
Schelling recognized the central place of homeostasis in life (the discovery of which is 
usually attributed to Claude Bernard), including its central role in sensory 
experience.146 With this homeostasis there is a duplicity in which a cause is active 
“only under the condition of a positive and negative reciprocal relation” in which the cause 
acts against outside influences.147 This is the basis of the organism’s receptivity, which 
makes the outer activity into a product or products for the organism that then affect it 
as an inner factor so that its activities are not merely the effect of the outside activity. 
Consequently, we can say that “[t]he organism has an external world because there is 
an original duplicity within it” while “[d]ead matter has no external world, it is 
absolutely identical and homogeneous with the whole whose part it is.”148
“Excitability”, Schelling argued, “must be posited as the essence of organism, by 
virtue of which alone the organic activity is really hindered from exhausting itself in its 
product that, therefore, never is, but always only becomes.”
 Schelling 
characterized this duplicitous receptivity “excitability.”  
149 This makes the 
organism an object to itself, and therefore makes it also a subject, and as such “the 
most original thing in Nature.”150
                                                     
143 Schelling, First Outline, 198; (We 7:279).  
 With excitability we have sensibility, irritability and 
the formative drive associated with reproduction. To quote Schelling:  
144 Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, 127; (SW I/3:496-98).. 
145 Schelling, First Outline, 54; (We 7:118). 
146 On the importance of homeostasis for understanding life see Walter B. Cannon, The Wisdom of the Body 
(New York: Norton, 1963), J. Scott Turner: The Extended Organism: The Physiology of Animal-Built Structures 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), and The Tinkerer’s Apprentice: How Design Emerges from Life 
Itself (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007).  
147 Schelling, First Outline, 109; (We 7:176). 
148 Schelling, First Outline, 112n.‡; (We 7:179). This notion of “world” clearly anticipates the biological 
theory of Jacob von Uexküll. 
149 Schelling, First Outline, 105; (We 7:170-1). 
150 Schelling, First Outline, 106; (We 7:172). 
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If the organism was not in equilibrium with itself, then this equilibrium could 
not be disturbed, and there would be no dynamical source of activity in the 
organism, there would be no sensibility. But precisely because sensibility is only 
the perturbation of the organic equilibrium, it is only recognizable in the 
continual restoration of the equilibrium. This restoration is displayed in the 
phenomena of irritability, which necessarily coexist. But because the product of 
every restoration is always again the organism itself, it appears at the lowest level 
as the constant self-production of the organism, and its cause appears as force of 
reproduction…151
From this general conception of living organisms Schelling distinguished organisms 
according to their chemical processes, what they are able to sense and respond to and 
their functional differentiation. Schelling also noted of that “If we move upwards in 
the scale of organization, we find that the senses gradually develop in that order in 
which, by means of them, the world of the organizations is enlarged.”
 
152 Thus there 
are differentiated organs such as the brain and the eye associated with the 
differentiation of sensibility from irritability, while irritability is associated with the 
heart.153
LIFE AND TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM 
 In this way Schelling could account for the emergence of human subjects. 
The derivation of categories through the examination of subjective experience was 
undertaken in Schelling’s most Fichtean work, his System of Transcendental Idealism. The 
object of this work is “the act of construction itself” that can only be grasped through the 
imagination of the aesthetic sense.154 It requires of philosophers that they be engaged 
in constant productive activity while reflecting on this production. Through this 
phenomenological investigation of experience as reflexive construction, or speculative 
dialectic, Schelling, like Fichte, set out to systematize Kant’s insights, “to bring system 
into my knowledge itself, and to seek within knowledge itself for that which all 
individual knowing is determined.”155 Schelling also followed Fichte in characterizing 
this active development of consciousness as a sequence of self-limitings, that is, as “a 
producing that becomes an object to itself, that is, an intellectual intuition,”156 and portrayed 
reason as a self-relation seeking to maintain identity in the face of otherness.157
                                                     
151 Schelling, First Outline, 148; (We 7:218). 
 Space 
152 Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, 124; (SW  I/3:492-94). 
153 Schelling, First Outline, 145; (We 7:214). 
154 Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, 13; (SW  I/3:350-51). 
155 Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, 18; (SW  I/3:357). 
156 Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, 28; (SW  I/3:369-71). 
157 Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, 118-9; (SW  I/3:486). 
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is defined as “nothing but objectified outer sense” and time as “nothing else but 
objectified inner sense.”158 And “[a]ll categories are modes of action, whereby objects 
themselves first come about for us.”159 Schelling also accepted Fichte’s argument that 
this development is only possible through being limited by the recognition of other 
intelligences and recognizing this recognition by the other.160 “[A] rational being in 
isolation could not only not arrive at a consciousness of freedom,” Schelling noted, 
“but would be equally unable to attain to consciousness of the objective world as 
such.”161 While granting priority of praxis over theory and seeing reason as productive 
rather than passive, he deduced by this imaginative production not only the forms 
and categories of the physical world, but also of organisms, of the capacity to abstract 
and think conceptually, of moral reasoning, of the legal order, of history and of 
teleology and art, revising and integrating the insights of Kant’s three critiques into 
one system and proposing an ethical and political philosophy that would overcome 
the atomistic, contractarian and utilitarian thinking of the British and French.162 As in 
the Philosophy of Nature, organization, especially that associated with living 
organisms, is given a central place with Schelling claiming that the “scale of 
organization merely refers to different stages in the evolution of the universe”, and 
that “organic nature furnishes the most obvious proof of transcendental idealism, for 
every plant is a symbol of the intelligence.”163
However, the System of Transcendental Idealism always presupposed the Philosophy of 
Nature in which the tendency to take Idealism as the whole of philosophy had already 
been criticized, and this criticism was reaffirmed in this work. As Schelling wrote in 
the introduction: “Only on completion of the system of transcendental philosophy will 
one come to recognize the necessity of a nature-philosophy, as a complementary 
science, and thereupon desist from making demands upon the former, which only a 
nature-philosophy can satisfy.”
  
164 Accordingly, Schelling emphasized that “the 
essence of man is active” in which he “exerts his powers upon a world which has 
influence upon him, lets him feel its forces, and upon which he can react.”165
                                                     
158 Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, 104; (SW  I/3:468). 
 In 
response to the question “whether the self is a thing-in-itself or an appearance” 
159 Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, 107; (SW  I/3:471-72). 
160 Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, 106; (SW  I/3:538). 
161 Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, 174; (SW  I/3:555-57). 
162 Beiser has revealed the importance of the Early Romantic’s political philosophy in “Religion and 
Politics in Frühromantik” in  The Romantic Imperative, ch.10. 
163 Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, 125; (SW  I/3:494-95) and 122; (SW  I/3:490-91). 
164 System of Transcendental Idealism, 7n.1; (SW  I/3:343n.1) 
165 Schelling, Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature, 10; (PN 4) 
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Schelling dismissed the question as absurd, since “there is assuredly a higher concept 
than that of thing, namely the concept of doing, or activity.”166 Limiting of this activity 
can only come about “through real opposition,” although this opposition only arises for 
the self through the action of self-positing.167 It is in this process of being really limited 
and positing itself as limited that the totality of objects is produced as a world for 
humans. That is, objects are products of the community of causation involving both 
the outer activity of Nature and the inner activity of humans as organisms, agents and 
intellects.168 In accordance with this assumption, it is also assumed that the human 
organism is a homeostatic system, clearly evident when Schelling considers sensations, 
anticipating recent research on nerve functions: “The possibility of sensation rests … 
[o]n the upset equilibrium of … two activities.”169 The same assumptions underlie 
Schelling’s claim that the transcendental philosopher can “bring forth for you the 
intelligence, with the whole system of its presentations.”170
In this scheme, philosophy begins when the unity within Nature is sundered, 
when “man sets himself in opposition to the external world.” It is then that reflection 
begins, separating “the object from the intuition, the concept from the image, finally 
(in that he becomes his own object) himself from himself.”
  
171 It is only then, when the 
original practical engagement as an active force within the world is forgotten, that the 
illusions of dualism, that were so problematic for Descartes and for Kant, appear. As 
Schelling suggested in the introduction to the first edition of his Ideas for a Philosophy of 
Nature, such reflection, when it becomes an end instead of a means, “torments human 
reason with chimeras” making “that separation between man and the world permanent, 
because it treats the latter as a thing-in-itself, which neither intuition nor imagination, 
neither understanding nor reason, can reach.”172
… the ideal activity is nothing without the to-be-intuited, the limitable, and, on 
that very account, the real. … Just as two activities reciprocally presuppose each 
other, so also do idealism and realism. If I reflect merely upon the ideal activity, 
there arises for me idealism, or the claim that the boundary is posited solely by 
 Schelling’s philosophy was designed 
to put an end to this torment, overcoming the opposition between idealism and 
realism. As he put it: 
                                                     
166 Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, 32; (SW  I/3:375-76). 
167 Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, 35; (SW  I/3:380-81). 
168 Schelling, First Outline, 202; (We 7 :284). 
169 Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, 56; (SW  I/3:405-6). On recent work confirming Schelling’s 
insight, see Turner, The Tinkerer’s Accomplice, 177-8. 
170 Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, 73; (SW  I/3:425-27). 
171 Schelling, Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature, 10; (PN 5). 
172 Schelling, Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature, 11n.4. 
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the self. If I reflect merely upon the real activity, there arises for me realism, or 
the claim that the boundary is independent of the self. If I reflect upon the two 
together, a third view arises from both, which may be termed ideal-realism.173
This transcendental ideal-realism led Schelling to value the individual and the 
concrete over the universal and the abstract, to respect the opacity of experience and 
to accord a central role to the unconscious in the activity of self-constitution of 
consciousness, although this role could only be postulated. The development of 
consciousnesses culminates not in the grasp of a timeless system but with an 
appreciation by individuals of their dependence on nature and on other intelligences 
and of the fragmentary texture of empirical reality. Schelling concluded this work by 
claiming that art should be valued for its ability to speak to us of that which cannot be 
depicted by philosophy (although shortly after this he affirmed the superiority by 
virtue of its greater comprehensiveness of philosophy) and which science can only 
aspire to depict.
 
174 As the Schellingian philosopher and interpreter of Schelling, 
Andrew Bowie wrote of Schelling’s defense of art: “Philosophy’s reliance on 
‘intellectual intuition’, in the sense of thinking about thinking, is itself an active 
process, but it is directed inwards, not towards an object, whereas the product of art is 
directed outwards, in order to reflect the unconscious through products (I/3. 
p.351).”175 The simple Kantian dualism between the synthetic, form-bearing subject 
and the unknown content-in-itself to be informed was replaced by an account of both 
the form and content of evolving Nature and Spirit.176 In a later work, the second 
version of Ages of the World, Schelling argued that, contrary to Kant’s characterization 
of science and his rejection of the claims of natural history to being a science (arguing 
for an “historical doctrine of nature, which contains nothing but … the description of 
nature as a system of classes of natural things ordered according to similarities, and 
the history of nature … as a systematic presentation of natural thing in different times 
and in different places” without any claim to being science),177
                                                     
173 Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, 41; (SW  I/3:386-87). 
 science has to recover 
its original meaning as history. A rigorously developed history of the cosmos, Earth 
174 Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, 221-33; (SW  I/3:614-30). On this development, see Beiser, 
German Idealism, 584-5. 
175 Andrew Bowie, Aesthetics and Subjectivity: From Kant to Nietzsche, 2nd ed. Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2003, 111. 
176 Peterson, “Translator’s Introduction”, Schelling, First Outline, xxvii. 
177 Kant, “Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science” 4; (Ak 4:468). On Kant’s denigration of the 
history of nature, see Phillip R. Sloan, “Kant on the history of nature: The Ambiguous heritage of the 
critical philosophy for natural history”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 37 
(2006): 627-648. See Kant, Critique of Judgment, §82, 312-17; (Ak 5:425-29). 
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and life on Earth within which human history can then be situated will provide the 
ultimate framework for understanding nature. “From now on,” Schelling proclaimed, 
“Science [Wissenschaft], according to the very meaning of the word, is history [Historie]. 
… From now on, science will present the development of an actual, living essence.”178
CONCLUSION 
  
Schelling was criticized by Hegel for carrying out his education in public.179 His works 
have an exploratory quality in which he is often struggling to reconcile irreconcilable 
ideas. For this reason it is possible to offer different interpretations of his philosophy. 
Here I have presented Schelling as a process metaphysician who developed and 
defended this by granting a place to dialectical construction to comprehend self-
organizing process and emergence, life, the evolution of nature and the development 
of consciousness, including the development of philosophy, science and art, and the 
self-consciousness of individuals. For the most part, the interpretation of his 
philosophy offered here is based on works written between 1798 and 1803 (when the 
revised second edition of Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature, originally published in 1797, was 
published), privileging his First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature published in 
1799, the work most strongly influenced by Goethe. On the History of Modern Philosophy, 
the lectures given in 1833-4 or 1835-6 and The Grounding of Modern Philosophy: The Berlin 
Lectures of 1842-43 have been utilized to confirm my interpretation of these earlier 
works. I have virtually ignored the Parmenidian tendencies in his “philosophy of 
identity” which was later repudiated by Schelling,180
                                                     
178 W.J. von Schelling, “Ages of the World” [second draft, 1813], in Slavoj Žižek, The Abyss of Freedom/Ages 
of the World, trans. Judith Norman, (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1997), 113. Here, 
Schelling was aligning himself with Herder against Kant, while having overcome Herder’s theoretical 
weaknesses that had aroused Kant’s hostility to Herder. 
 Nor have I discussed Schelling’s 
179 George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy (3 vols), trans. E.S. Haldane and 
Frances H. Simson (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995), vol. 3, 513.  
180 The philosophy of identity was briefly argued for in Presentation of My System of Philosophy (1801) and in 
Further Presentations from the System of Philosophy (1802). Selections from the Presentation; (SW I/4: 107 - 144) 
and Further Presentations From the System of Philosophy;  (SW 1/4: 361 – 411) have been translated by Michael 
G. Vater in The Philosophical Forum, XXXII (4) (Winter, 2001): 339-371 and 373-397. Versions of the 
identity theory were also presented in “On The Relationship of the Philosophy of Nature to Philosophy 
in General” published in Kritisches Journal der Philosophie, I, no.3 (1802): 1-25, translated in Between Kant and 
Hegel, 363-382, and in “System of Philosophy in General and of the Philosophy of Nature in Particular 
(1804, based on posthumous manuscripts)” in  Idealism and the Endgame of Theory: Three Essays by F.W.J. 
Schelling, trans., ed. and intro. Thomas Pfau (New York: SUNY Press, 1994), 139-194). On Schelling’s 
repudiation of this philosophy, see On the History of Modern Philosophy, 152; (SW I/10: 150). 
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postulation of a primordial will, central to his celebrated work, Of Human Freedom,181
Schelling was at his most radical when he wrote his First Outline of a System of the 
Philosophy of Nature and shortly thereafter, and later views often reflect his failure to 
uphold this radicalism. The Parmenidian digression is of interest to reveal how 
difficult it has been for philosophers to overcome Parmenides’ influence on European 
thought and the source of Schelling’s problematic determinism. It was also the point 
of departure for Hegel’s philosophy that led Schelling to thoroughly rethink his own 
position, and silenced him for decades and led to a complete rejection of the impulse 
to “geometrize” the dialectic.
 a 
work which had a major influence on Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Heidegger, and I 
have not discussed Schelling’s later differentiation between “positive” and “negative” 
philosophy and how this relates to Schelling’s philosophy of nature.  
182 The notion of will, while appearing radical, is a 
retreat from Schelling’s radical abandonment of the category of substance entailed by 
his notion of “productivity” in his earlier work. Schelling’s reaction to Fichte in 
turning to the philosophy of nature already foreshadowed aspects of his later positive 
philosophy expounded in The Grounding of Positive Philosophy, and Schelling’s notion of 
the unvordenkliche Seyn (unprethinkable being – being already presupposed by any act of 
thinking), deployed to attack Hegel’s philosophy, highlighted differences between 
Schelling and Hegel that were implicit from the beginning, but only later became 
clear to Schelling.183
                                                     
181 Schelling: Of Human Freedom [1809] trans. James Gutmann, (Chicago: Open Court, 1936), 40-1; (SW I/7: 
364-5) 
 To go into this issue would lead too far afield, however. The 
main concern here, and what it is hoped has been shown, is that despite some wild 
ideas and frequent vagueness, Schelling in his early works was offering a coherent and 
convincing response to the difficulties raised by Kant’s philosophy that Kant himself 
had acknowledged, a response that was to some extent foreshadowed in Kant’s 
published work and found surprisingly close parallels in Kant’s late unpublished 
writings. In terms of Schelling’s understanding of dialectics, he had demonstrated the 
superiority of his philosophy to Kant’s which in turn had advanced beyond all 
preceding philosophy. While partly through a failure to carry through his most radical 
insights to their logical conclusion and a disinclination to even aim at a final, closed 
system of thought, Schelling never developed his system with the rigor of Kant’s 
philosophy. However, by overcoming Kant’s dualisms and gulfs Schelling resolved the 
182 The case for this has been made by Émile Meyerson in “Schelling’s Objections”, Explanation in the Exact 
Science [1927], trans. Mary-Alice and David A. Sipfle, (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991), ch.12. 
183 As Meyerson noted in Explanation in the Exact Sciences, 336-7.  The notion of unvordenkliche Seyn is 
introduced by Schelling in The Grounding of Positive Philosophy (Philosophie der Offenbarung 1841/42); (SW II/3: 
160). 
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problems that Kant was addressing and was able to sketch the basis for a more 
coherent tradition of philosophy as a consequence, the tradition of process 
metaphysics. 
There is much more to Schelling than simply having overcome the problems in 
Kant’s philosophy; he added new dimensions to philosophy. Schelling was centrally 
concerned with the individual as a creative agent and provided a defense of the role of 
philosophy in people’s lives. He believed that philosophy must enter into life, not only 
the individual life, but into the condition of the time, into history and into humanity. 
It must penetrate everything. “Human affairs do not allow themselves to be governed 
by mathematics, physics, natural history … or even poetry and art” Schelling 
proclaimed. We could extend this list to include economics, psychology or 
management theory. “The true understanding of the world is provided by precisely 
the right metaphysics.”184 It is this exalted view of philosophy, espoused in the Berlin 
lectures, that inspired the whole tradition of thought from Søren Kierkegaard, the 
young Karl Marx and Friedrich Nietzsche to Martin Heidegger. It contributed to 
Lebensphilosophie, to existentialism and the dialogic philosophy of Mikhail Bakhtin and 
his circle.185
It is precisely this tendency, and its influence, that led Lukács to condemn 
Schelling as an irrationalist and the source of irrationalism. Clearly, many of those 
influenced by Schelling did push his ideas in an irrationalist direction. However, 
irrationalism itself is merely the obverse of forms of rationalism that exclude 
important aspects of reality. The quest for greater rationality has never escaped the 
dilemma that in excluding domains that cannot be dealt with from this perspective 
they have actually supported irrationalism. Extreme rationalism and irrationalism are 
inseparable. The rationalism of Parmenides led him to deny reality to diversity, 
change and life in the world, rendering any notion of rationality in human affairs 
unintelligible. It was Descartes’ rationalism inspired by his work in mathematics and 
physics that eventually led to Hume’s irrationalism. It was the rationalism of the 
French philosophes that evoked J.G. Hamann’s attacks on rationality. It was Kant’s 
excessive rationalism that evoked the defence of irrationalism by Friedrich Jacobi. It 
was Hegel’s panrationalism that appeared to give no place to the individual that 
 It was this concern that philosophy be relevant to life that drove Schelling 
to focus on the particular, the apparently irrational and that which is beyond normal 
language.  
                                                     
184 Schelling, The Grounding of Positive Philosophy, 107; (SW II/3:27). 
185 The influence of Schelling on Bakhtin is under-appreciated. See Miroslav Orel, ‘F.W.J. Schelling’s 
and M.M. Bakhtin’s Process Thinking’, Concrescence, 3, 2002: 1-12, 
http://www.concrescence.org/index.php/ajpt/article/view/119.  
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evoked Kierkegaard to focus on the category of the individual and Arthur 
Schopenhauer and Friedrich Nietzsche to focus on the will. It was the dry rationalism 
of the neo-Kantians that evoked the irrationalist tendencies in Lebensphilosophie and in 
Martin Heidegger’s philosophy. It was the desiccated rationality of the logical 
empiricists under the spell of advances in symbolic logic that evoked interest in 
existentialism and mystical religions. And it was Hegelian and orthodox Marxist 
panrationalism together with the instrumental rationality of modernism that evoked 
the antirationalism of deconstructive postmodernism. The real challenge to 
irrationalism comes from those who are equally committed to rationality and to doing 
justice to variety, the particularities of existence and to creativity. Schelling was 
exemplary in this regard, and those sharing this commitment are his true heirs.186
Maurice Merleau-Ponty illustrates this point. Strongly influenced by Hegel, Marx 
and Lukács himself, Merleau-Ponty was also concerned with the issues raised by the 
existentialists: the problems of consciousness, freedom, agency, sociality, emotion and 
human creativity. As a Marxist acutely aware of the failures and oppressive tendencies 
of communism, he argued that even if the past of humanity evidenced rational 
progress, there is no guarantee that this would be true of the future. Attacking 
Cartesian dualism, empiricism and Kantian intellectualism he used a 
phenomenological approach to elucidate the embodied, social nature of consciousness 
and strove throughout his career to make philosophy central to life, portraying 
humans as the products/producers of history who have the capacity to create a more 
rational social order. However, he rejected Edmund Husserl’s view that 
phenomenology should be a rigorous, presuppositionless and apodictic science of 
experience that would provide the foundations for all other forms of enquiry, and 
developed a dialectical form of phenomenology through which science, art and 
history could all be given a place and could advance philosophy. Towards the end of 
his career he turned to natural philosophy to provide support for and defend his 
insights into consciousness and social life. He turned to Schelling himself, the source 
of the tradition of natural philosophy and process metaphysics concerned to do justice 
  
                                                     
186 As the Schellingian philosopher A.N. Whitehead succinctly characterized his own view on this in 
Modes of Thought, (New York: The Free Press, 1938), 98: ‘The procedure of rationalism is the discussion of 
analogy. The limitation of rationalism is the inescapable diversity.’   It was their capacity to give a place 
to reason and creativity that was the basis of Murray Code’s defense of C.S. Peirce and Whitehead 
against Bertrand Russell and Willard van Orman Quine in Myths of Reason: Vagueness, Rationality and the 
Lure of Logic, (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1995).  
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to the reality of consciousness as an emergent process within nature.187 The recovery 
of Schelling was necessary to integrate the diverse issues that Merleau-Ponty was 
grappling with, offering a philosophy through which the best aspects of Hegelian 
social and political philosophy could be revised and defended against various forms of 
reductionism, including Hegelian Marxist reductionism which reduced people to and 
legitimated their treatment as instruments of the world-historical process.188
The contribution of Schelling’s philosophy to genuine rationalism is most clearly 
evident in his influence on the subsequent development of metaphysics, mathematics 
and science. In developing a system of philosophy Schelling redefined both 
philosophy and science, defending a form of dialectical rationality and fallibilist 
metaphysics that, transcending the opposition between dogmatic philosophy and 
critical philosophy, liberated the revolutionary potential of Kant’s and Fichte’s critical 
philosophy to give a more central role to philosophy in science than either Kant or 
Fichte could acknowledge. This provided a place for natural philosophy (or 
“speculative physics”), natural history and evolutionary theory and a stronger defense 
of the importance of the arts than Kant, or Hegel, were able to provide. In doing so, 
Schelling inspired the modern tradition of process metaphysics.
 
189
My views were probably influenced by Schelling … by all stages of Schelling, 
but especially by the Philosophie der Natur. I consider Schelling enormous … If you 
were to call my philosophy Schellingianism transformed in the light of modern 
physics, I should not take it hard.
 C.S. Peirce made 
clear his indebtedness to Schelling when he wrote in a letter to William James:  
190
Peirce later referred to himself as a “Schellingian of some stripe.”
 
191
                                                     
187 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Nature: Course Notes from the Collège de France, trans. Robert Vallier (Evanston: 
Illinois, 2003), 36-51. See also William S. Hamrick and Jan Van der Veken, Nature and Logos: A 
Whiteheading Key to Merleau-Ponty’s Fundamental Thought, (New York: SUNY Press, 2011). 
 While the 
influence of Schelling on Henri Bergson, Aleksandr Bogdanov, Alfred North 
188 This was the basis of Leszek Kolakowski’s attack on Marxism in his Main Currents of Marxism , trans. 
P.S. Falla, 3 volumes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981). 
189 For an account of process metaphysics, see Nicholas Rescher, Process Metaphysics (New York: State 
University of New York Press, 1996). This does not include Schelling, but does include Peirce, Bergson 
and Whitehead. Peirce characterized himself at various times as a conditional idealist, a scholastic realist 
and a pragmaticist. It is clear that Peirce was struggling to find a name for his philosophy, and I am 
suggesting “process metaphysician” is the most accurate. On this problem, see Sandra B. Roshenthal, 
Charles Peirce’s Pragmatic Pluralism (New York: SUNY Press 1994), 108.  
190 Letter dated January 28th, 1894, quoted by Joseph L. Esposito, Schelling’s Idealism and Philosophy of Nature 
(Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1977), 203;  
191 C.S. Peirce, Collected Paper (8 vols), ed. Charles Hartshorne, Paul Weiss and A. W. Burks (Cambridge, 
MA.: Harvard University Press, 1931-1966), 6.605.  
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Whitehead, George Herbert Mead, Ludwig von Bertalanffy and other process 
metaphysicians was less direct, it has been shown that they can only be fully 
understood as belonging to a Schellingian tradition of philosophical thought.192
Developing an open, creative form of dialectics (developed further by, among 
others, F. Schleiermacher, the mathematicians Justus and Hermann Grassmann, the 
process metaphysicians C.S. Peirce and Alfred North Whitehead, and humanistic 
Marxists such as Lucien Goldmann and Maurice Merleau-Ponty),
 It is 
the tradition of process metaphysics that most fully realizes Schelling’s contribution to 
philosophy, and it is through this Schellingian tradition that philosophy has 
contributed most creatively to science.  
193 Schelling not 
only anticipated (while avoiding the problems of) those philosophers of science 
characterized by Nick Jardine as “Kantians on wheels”194 such as Ernst Cassirer,195
                                                     
192 See Arran Gare, “The Roots of Postmodernism: Schelling, Process Philosophy and Poststructuralism”, 
Process and Difference: Between Cosmological and Poststucturalist Postmodernisms, ed. Catherine Keller and Anne 
Daniell (New York: State University of New York Press, 2002), 36. Whitehead was deeply influenced by 
Hermann Grassmann whose work was the point of departure for Whitehead’s first major work, A Treatise 
on Universal Algebra. See Andrew Dawson, “Whitehead’s Universal Algebra”, Handbook of Whiteheadian 
Process Thought, [Vol.2], (Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag), 67-86. Friedrich Engels who, despite his understanding 
of himself was also a process metaphysician, was also strongly influenced by Schelling. 
 
193 On Schleiermacher’s indebtedness to Schelling, see Manfred Frank, “Metaphysical Foundations: a 
look at Schleiermacher’s Dialectic”, The Cambridge Companion to Friedrich Schleiermacher, ed. Jacqueline 
Marina, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, 15-34. On the dialectic in Justus and Hermann 
Grassmann, see Albert C. Lewis, “H. Grassmann’s 1844 Ausdehnungslehre and Schleiermacher’s Dialektik”, 
Annals of Science, 34(2) (1977): 103-162. C.S. Peirce’s triadic logic influenced by Schelling (involving 
inseparably abduction, deduction and induction) is really a form of dialectics, as is A.N. Whitehead’s 
characterization of reason in his The Function of Reason, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1929). 
Through Lucien Goldmann’s engagement with Kant, the neo-Kantian Emil Lask and Marxists, most 
importantly, Lukács, Goldmann developed a form of Schellingian dialectics without being directly 
influenced by Schelling. On the development of Goldmann’s notion of dialectics, see Mitchell Cohen, 
The Wager of Lucian Goldmann: Tragedy, Dialectics, and the Hidden God, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1994), esp. 117-153. Goldmann regarded Jean Piaget as one of the greatest dialectical thinkers of his time. 
See Lucien Goldmann, Cultural Creation, trans. Bart Grahl (Saint Louis: Telos Press), 1976, 126-7. The 
Marxist ecologist, Richard Levins, has defended what is essentially a Schellingian notion of dialectics in 
‘Dialectics and Systems Theory’, Richard Lewontin and Richard Levins, Biology Under the Influence: 
Dilectical Essays on Ecology, Agriculture, and Health (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2007), ch.17. One of 
the most illuminating studies and defences of dialectics as the highest stage of cognitive development, 
Klaus F. Reigel, Foundations of Dialectical Psychology (New York: Academic Press, 1979), largely concurs with 
Schelling’s conception of dialectics. Roy Bhaskar’s Dialectic: The Pulse of Freedom, (London: Verso, 1993) is a 
major advance in dialectical thought, in my view defective because he did not take into account 
Schelling’s arguments against Hegel and did not acknowledge the unprethinkable being preceding all 
thought.  
194 See Nick Jardine in “Hermeneutic strategies in Gerd Buchdahl’s Kantian philosophy of science”, 
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 34, (2003):183-208, 205. 
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Thomas Kuhn, Gerd Buchdahl196 and Imré Lakatos, but also work in science itself. 
Despite the radical nature of Kant’s own thinking, his early contribution to 
astronomy, his contribution to biology and his contribution to dynamics, his system 
was really a defense of “normal” science, which at the time, was Newtonian science 
(although Kant was also influenced by Euler). Kant was only able to reconcile this 
with his defense of freedom and morality, even when he acknowledged the 
significance of art and the place of purpose in nature, through the postulation of a 
transcendent God whose existence had to remain a mere postulate. By facing up to 
this problem and using Kant’s critical approach to challenge the standing of 
mechanistic mathematical physics, Schelling gave a place to “revolutionary” science. 
This involved acknowledging the role of speculative metaphysics in challenging and 
replacing old categories and conceptual schemes and opening up new avenues of 
scientific research, a view that was revived in the twentieth century.197 The arguments 
of Joseph Esposito, Marie-Luise Heuser and others that Schelling had a major 
influence on the development of mathematics, physics, chemistry and biology 
generated a major debate on this issue.198 Lenoir counter-claimed that German 
biologists were hostile to the influence of Schelling and were in fact guided by Kant’s 
ideas in biology, with this claim in turn being contested by Robert Richards, 
Frederick Beiser and Iain Hamilton Grant, among others.199 The contribution to 
science of Schellingians is now generally recognized among historians of science who 
have studied Schelling,200
                                                                                                                                           
195 Ernst Cassirer’s Substance and Function and Einstein’s Theory of Relativity, trans. W.C. and M.C. Swabey 
(London: Dover, 2004), was strongly influenced by Schellingian thought through the influence on him of 
Hermann Grassmann. 
 although as I have argued, they have still not done full 
justice to Schelling’s work.  
196 Buchdahl’s indebtedness to hermeneutic phenomenology, influenced by Heidegger (who was 
influenced by Schelling), was pointed out by Jardine.  As noted, Goldmann recognized Jean Piaget, who 
influenced Thomas Kuhn, as a dialectical thinker. For an exposition and defence of this form of dialectics 
for science and metaphysics, see Arran Gare, “Epistemology, Dialectics and Metaphysics”, Nihilism Inc. 
(Sydney: Eco-Logical Press, 1996), ch.12. 
197 See for instance C.H. Waddington ed., Sketching Theoretical Biology: Toward a Theoretical Biology [1969] 
(New Brunswick: Aldine, 2010),  41 & 72 where the defence of the role of metaphysics in science by David 
Bohm and Waddington, influenced by Peirce and Whitehead, echoes Schelling’s philosophy. 
198 See Esposito, Schelling’s Idealism and Philosophy of Nature, Heuser-Kessler, Die Produktivität der Natur: 
Schellings Naturphilosophie und das neue Paradigma der Selbsorganization in den Naturwissenschaften and Marie-Luise 
Heuser, “The Significance of Naturphilosphe for Justus and Hermann Grassmann”, From Past to Future: 
Grassmann’s Work in Context, ed. H.-J. Petsche et.al., (Basel: Springer, 2011), 49-59.  
199 See note 3 above.  
200 For the seminal influence of Schelling on physics, see L. Pearce Williams, The Origins of Field Theory 
(Lanham: University Press of America, 1980), ch.2. The influence of Schelling on the development of 
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I have outlined here some of the ideas which did play a major role in the 
development of biology of the Nineteenth Century such as the notion of homeostasis. 
More importantly, Schelling put forward ideas that came into their own in the 
Twentieth Century with research in theories of emergence, including hierarchy 
theory, post-reductionist evolutionary theory, geography and ecology,201 evolutionary 
and genetic epistemology, ethology, biosemiotics, biohermeneutics and philosophical 
biology, the study of complex adaptive systems and endophysics, most of which have 
been indirectly influenced by him.202 Despite Lenoir’s dismissive attitude towards 
biologists influenced by Schelling, Twentieth Century developments in the study of 
morphogenesis also vindicated the tradition of biology inspired by him (and Goethe). 
Lenoir characterized the views of this school of thought as “transcendental 
morphology”, as opposed to the “teleo-mechanists” inspired by Kant.203 
Characterizing them as transcendentalists, Lenoir failed to appreciate how this 
tradition understood mathematics and its role in comprehending nature. What this 
Schellingian tradition aspired to was a “dynamist, morphogenetic mathematics” 
which would “be able to decipher the internal, dynamic structure of nature” without 
presupposing matter and extension, but which would account for the emergence of 
patterns.204
                                                                                                                                           
field theory had already been recognized by Hermann Weyl in Philosophy of Mathematics and Natural Science 
[1927], Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949, p.176. 
  It was this ambition that inspired Alfred North Whitehead and, following 
him, the theoretical biology movement formed in Britain in the 1930s, led by C.H. 
Waddington and Joseph Needham, to investigate “mathematico-physico-chemical 
morphology”. Waddington’s student, Brian Goodwin, who continued this work under 
201 On Schelling’s influence on geography, and through this, ecology (mainly through Alexander von 
Humboldt), see Chengxi Tang, The Geographic Imagination of Modernity: Geography, Literature and Philosophy 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), ch.3, esp.120f., and ch.5, esp. 166 – 180 (on von Humboldt). 
202 See for instance Marie-Luise Heuser-Kessler, “Schelling’s Concept of Self-Organization”, Evolution of 
Dynamical Structures in Complex Systems, ed. Rudolf Frierich and Arne Wunderlin (Berlin: Springer Verlag, 
1992), 395-415 and Heuser-Kessler, Die Produktivität der Natur: Schellings Naturphilosophie und das neue Paradigma 
der Selbsorganization in den Naturwissenschaften. Erich Jantsch’s The Self-Organizing Universe, (Oxford: Pergamen 
Press, 1985), Salthe’s Development and Evolution and Lynn Margulis’ and Dorian Sagan’s What is Life? 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995) can be seen as Twentieth Century reformulations of 
Schelling’s view of nature. The relevance of Schelling’s work to the present is evident in the themes 
addressed (including the limitations of mathematics for understanding emergence and the need to give 
place to stories) by Kalevi Kull (see for instance, “Semiotic ecology; different natures in the semiosphere”, 
Sign System Studies 26 (1998): 344-371), Stuart Kauffman in  Investigations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000), and Anton Markoš, “In quest of novelty: Kauffman’s biosphere and Lotman’s semiosphere”, Sign 
System Studies 32(1/2), (2004): 310-327 and his Readers of the Book of Life: Contextualizing Developmental 
Evolutionary Biology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).  
203 Lenoir, The Strategy of Life, 147. 
204 Heuser, “The Significance of Naturphilosophie for Justus and Hermann Grassmann”, 58. 
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the banner of “process structuralism”, acknowledged his indebtedness to Goethe.205 
Schelling also supported the idea that the Earth itself is alive, a notion revived by 
James Lovelock in the 1970s and supported by Goodwin, and now recognized as 
crucial in the struggle to face up to and address the global ecological crisis.206
In relating all this to people’s lives, Schelling’s work is now more relevant than 
ever before. The situation we are in was very succinctly summed up by Richard 
Tarnas: “In the absence of any viable, embracing cultural vision, old assumptions 
remain blunderingly in force, providing an increasingly unworkable and dangerous 
blueprint for human thought and activity.”
  
207 By overcoming the limitation of Kant’s 
philosophy, Schelling has provided the basis for definitively transcending scientific 
materialism, in doing so, overcoming the opposition between science and the 
humanities and enabling people to understand themselves as culturally formed, 
socially situated, creative participants within nature.208 Most importantly, Schelling 
confronted and charted a path to overcome the nihilism into which European 
civilization was and is descending, a nihilism that is reaching its apogee in the 
deification of the global market, postmodern fragmentation and the specter of global 
ecocide. In his later work on myth and revelation Schelling noted that “through the 
virtually unrestricted expansion of world relations… the Orient and the Occident are 
not merely coming into contract with one another, but are being compelled … to fuse 
into one and the same consciousness, into one consciousness that should for this 
reason alone be expanded into a world-consciousness.”209 While overcoming the 
parochialism of the European Weltanschauung, this will also necessitate breaking free 
from past forms of religion; but what is true in mythology and revelation should be 
preserved, providing a religious dimension to this world-consciousness. To this end, 
Schelling argued, it will be necessary to develop a “philosophical religion”, addressing 
and integrating the freedom of existence, historical phenomena and nature into an 
expanded Weltanschauung inclusive enough to overcome philosophy’s compulsive 
tendency to splinter off into mutually exclusive schools of thought.210
                                                     
205 See Brian Goodwin, How the Leopard Changed its Spots, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1994), and 
Gerry Webster and Brian Goodwin, Form and Transformation: Generative and Relational Principles in Biology, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 110. 
 Schelling noted 
206 See the papers in Gaia in Action: Science of a Living Earth, ed. Peter Bunyard, (Wilts: Floris Books, 1996). 
207 Richard Tarnas, The Passion of the Western Mind, (New York: Ballantine Books, 1991), 409. 
208 See Günther Witzany, Life: the Communicative Structure, trans. Michael Stachowitsch (Norderstedt: Libri 
GmbH, 2000), esp. 18-20. See also, Arran Gare, “Human Ecology, Process Philosophy and the Global 
Ecological Crisis”, Concrescence, 1 (2000): 4-5. 
209 Schelling, The Grounding of Positive Philosophy, 94; (SW II/3: 8) 
210 F.W.J. Schelling, Historical-critical Introduction to the Philosophy of Mythology, trans. Mason Richey and 
Markus Zisselsberger, (New York: S.U.N.Y. Press, 2007), 173-4; (SW II/4: 364-6) 
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that at the time of his lecture this philosophical religion did not yet exist. Lovelock’s 
notion of Gaia, transcending the parochialism of particular civilizations, concurring 
with Schelling’s philosophy of nature and offering a religious dimension to scientific 
theory, can be seen as a significant contribution to the development of this 
philosophical religion.211
By recognizing Schelling’s place in the history of philosophy and in science we 
can now appreciate the process metaphysicians and the scientists influenced by them 
not merely as isolated thinkers of brilliance, but as part of a powerful tradition of 
thought working towards the creation of a global civilization. This tradition is 
continuing Schelling’s struggle against nihilism and his integral view of humans as 
creative historical agents within nature, in which philosophy, science, the arts and the 
humanities are playing a crucial role in the self-creation of humanity and of life on 
Earth. We can now see the lineaments of this new civilization emerging in response to 
the global ecological crisis as the ecological civilization being called for by Chinese 
environmentalists, a call now being taken up internationally.
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211 Philosophical work associated with process theology can also be seen as a contribution to this. See 
David Ray Griffin ed. The Reenchantment of Science, (New York: S.U.N.Y. Press, 1988.) See also Stuart A. 
Kauffman, Reinventing the Sacred, (New York: Perseus, 2008). 
212 See Arran Gare, “Toward an Ecological Civilization: The Science, Ethics and Politics of Eco-Poiesis”,  
Process Studies, 39(1) (2010): 5-38.  
